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Commentary on ‘Governance Principles for Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction’ 
 
Richard A. Barnes 




This paper comments upon the list of governance principles for areas beyond national 
jurisdiction (ABNJ) advanced in the Report by Alex Oude Elferink. It begins by considering 
the meaning of governance principles, and how they can contribute to the development of the 
legal regime for ABNJ. It suggests that such principles need to be rooted in more than 
existing rules, although such rules provide an important means of inducing the existence of 
general principles. Governance principles need to be properly aligned with the nature of the 
spaces and resources found in ABNJ, as well as with fundamental values of the international 
community and contours of legal authority. The paper offers some further comments on the 
specific principles, emphasising the importance of not just strong procedural approaches, but 
also principles that facilitate a sound and reliable knowledge basis for decision-making and 
that advance a strong version of integrated management. 
 
Keywords: 





The question of how best to regulate areas and activities located beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction is one of paramount concern to international lawyers. Apart from the practical 
need for rules to ensure that activities are conducted in a conflict-free, safe and 
environmentally sensitive manner, the issue is also of concern because of the particular 
political and intellectual challenges it provokes. What rules should be adopted, how, and by 
whom, and, more fundamentally, what values should such rules advance? Areas beyond the 
limits of (exclusive) national jurisdiction (ABNJ) are necessarily subject to collective 
regulation. This means that any regulation ought to be inclusive of the interests of all States 
and, potentially, the international community as a whole. Here the distinction is between the 
disaggregated views of States and the aggregate views of the international community. This 
presents myriad problems, not least in distinguishing between such views, but in finding the 
means, institutional or otherwise, to capture these values.  
The purpose of this paper is to reflect upon some aspects of this complex set of issues 
in light of Alex Oude Elferink‟s Report on the Design and Operation of Governance 
Principles for ABNJ. That Report sets out and comments upon a list of eleven principles and 
four potential principles that could be used to direct the more specific regulation of ABNJ. 
Fortunately, there is considerable merit in his review of the issues, so one is afforded the 
luxury of adding a gloss to his efforts, although it is hoped that some of the comments will 
also provoke further debate about the content and role of these principles. In the second part 
of this paper, some reflections are provided concerning the „legal‟ nature of oceans 
governance principles, first in terms of their broader legitimacy, and then second in terms of 
how they fit within existing structures of international law. In the third part of this paper, I 
consider the key principles in turn, exploring where there may be room for strengthening the 
Copy edited Manuscript
Click here to download Manuscript: Barnes_edited.doc 
 2 
authority of each principle and noting any potential problems, whether practical or 
conceptual, with the scope of each principle. 
 
 
The Meaning and Legitimacy of Governance Principles 
 
For Oude Elferink, there are two reasons for formulating the list. The first is to provide 
unequivocal reconfirmation that these principles have to be applied to ABNJ. The second is 
to provide a sound basis for developing a coherent regime for the governance of ABNJ.
1
 In 
adopting this position, Oude Elferink regards the list to be somewhat declaratory, i.e., a 
restatement of principles that already exist and apply to ABNJ. The process is inductive and 
so Oude Elferink takes time to provide evidence in support of each principle. Although this 
may be sufficient, it is useful to dig a little deeper into the question of the role of such 
principles, since it is useful to have some external measure of the principles‟ legitimacy other 
than their purely instrumental function. Also, an inductive approach perhaps constrains future 
opportunities by focusing on what exists at present and may be regarded as self-limiting.
2
 We 
have the opportunity to design such principles with an eye on developing a better regulatory 
regime.  
In an earlier exploration of the principles and objectives of oceans governance, Treves 
was keen to point out that governance does not always coincide with the concept used by 
lawyers; it includes the idea of “good government, government for the general interest of 
those governed, on the basis of commonly shared values and with the involvement of 
stakeholders”.
3
 This rightly alludes to the broader legitimacy that any system or governance 
regime must possess if it is to succeed. Oude Elferink‟s principles may well possess 
legitimacy in narrow legal terms, but they should also possess a deeper sense of legitimacy.
4
 
Taking our lead from Treves, one means of evaluating Oude Elferink‟s principles is to 
ask whether or not they conform to broader ideas of good governance. Notions of governance 
abound in the wider academic literature.
5
 It is a rather mutable concept, but it is generally 
understood to be concerned with direction, delivery, facilitation, and information provision in 
the context of a decision-making process. Thus Krasner talks of “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors‟ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations”.
6
 However, it is not simply governance to 
which we aspire, but a particular quality of good governance. This is much more difficult to 
articulate and reach agreement on. Accounts of good governance generally include: 
                                                   
1   A.G. Oude Elferink, Governance Principles for Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, Report on Research 
Question 2 of the Study on „Biological Diversity and Governance of the High Seas‟ (commissioned by the 
Netherlands Ministry of Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation) (2011). A revised version of the Report is included 
as one of the contributions to this Special Issue (see Introduction). 
2 See A. D‟Amato, „International Law as an Autopoietic System‟ in R. Wolfrum and V. Rӧben (eds.), 
Developments of International Law in Treaty Making (Springer, Berlin, 2005), 335. 
3 T. Treves, „Principles and Objectives of the Legal Regime Governing Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction‟ in 
A.G. Oude Elferink and E.J. Molenaar (eds.), The International Regime of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: 
Current and Future Developments (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010), 7-25, at 7. 
4 On the legitimacy of law generally, see further, J. Brunée and S. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).  
5 For a useful perspective see S.J. Toope, „Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law‟ in M. Byers 
(ed.), The Role of International Law in Politics. Essays in International Relations and International Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), 91. Also, P. Sands, „International Law in the Field of Sustainable 
Development‟ (1994) 65 British Yearbook of International Law 303-81; K. Ginther, E. Denters and P.J.I.M de 
Waart (eds.), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 1995). 
6 S. Krasner, „Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables‟ in S. Krasner 
(ed.), International Regimes (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983), 2. 
 3 
participation of stakeholders, accountability of decision-makers, the existence of institutions 
capable of supporting decision-making, procedural or substantive integration in the regulation 
of subject matter, and some degree of certainty so as to provide a basis for forming 
expectations about future behaviour.
7
 Good governance also includes adaptability, because 
social and real world conditions are not fixed in stone, and so decision-making must be 
capable of accommodating new eventualities. Such attributes permeate Oude Elferink‟s 
principles, especially respect for the law of the sea, international cooperation, the integrated 
approach, public availability of information, and transparent and open decision-making. 
Indeed, nothing in this list visibly challenges our ideas of good governance. The real 
challenges will come when trying to put these principles into practice. 
It may be noted that governance as outlined above is overtly about how to make 
decisions. It is a means to an end, rather than the end itself. This suggests an overtly 
procedural approach. This is not necessarily problematic, as long as sufficient procedures or 
institutions exist to support decision-making. This may be more problematic, for at present 
decision-making in respect of ABNJ remains highly decentralised and rather fragmented. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the principles should also be concerned with the substantive 




Some of Oude Elferink‟s principles touch upon substantive matters, such as the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, sustainable and equitable use, and 
stewardship. However, these are couched in rather general terms and Oude Elferink takes 
some care to avoid being drawn into any consideration of resource distribution. For example, 
he suggests that the principle of sustainable use should accommodate the views of both 
groups of States, supporting either free access or the application of common heritage to 
marine genetic resources in ABNJ.
9
 Further reliance is placed upon the highly contextual 
notion of equitable use, thereby avoiding making any generalisations about who gets what 
and when. That said, even Rawls shied away from an overtly redistributive approach, 
preferring to leave such uncertain matters to ongoing dialogue and process.
10
  
Here is not the place to engage in a sustained critique of procedural fairness in 
international law. However, one can observe that since the formal equality of States has 
limited influence on actual decision-making, even formal procedural guarantees may not 
result in equitable outcomes. Unless the institutions of governance can properly structure and 
facilitate the interactions of all States, then adopting a limited or minimalist procedural 
approach exposes one to the criticism that one is simply reinforcing structural inequalities 
between States.  
Another approach is to ask whether or not the application of governance principles is 
properly aligned with the regulatory subject matter. The value of this approach is that such an 
alignment can reinforce not only the procedural principles, but also the substantive principles, 
since they are concerned with a broader range of values. Arguably, there are three measures 
of „fit‟ that can be used to test the suitability of governance principles: physical fit, legal fit 
and moral fit. In addition, we might consider political fit and intellectual fit.  
The first test of fit is to ask whether or not the principles of governance are properly 
aligned with the physical nature of the subject matter to which they apply. If law is to be 
meaningful, it must not ignore the natural limits of the subject matter. Thus we do not 
                                                   
7 See, for example, the principles listed in: European Commission, White Paper on European Governance 
(WPEG), COM(2001) 428 final [2001] OJ C287/1.  Also, C. Harlowe, „Global Administrative Law: The Quest 
for Principles and Values‟ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 187. 
8 T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), at 7-9. 
9 Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section on Sustainable and Equitable Use, Discussion. 
10 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972), at 304. 
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legislate for bottled sunlight or treat finite resources as renewable. What then are the physical 
attributes of ABNJ that determine the fit of governance principles? Some of the general 
attributes of ocean spaces in ABNJ have been known for centuries. Thus the boundless and 
inexhaustible qualities of the oceans sustained the Grotian principles of freedom of the high 
seas for centuries.
11
 However, there is now better awareness of the complex relations within 
and between ecosystems which may demand more nuanced regulatory approaches that can 
account for such interactions. Ocean waters remain physically unbound and fluid, capable of 
interactions with water bodies within and beyond national jurisdiction. The quality of water 
bodies is sustained and replenished through complex global processes. This means that water 
bodies in ABNJ should not be governed in isolation from other marine or natural 
environments. Thus the principles must embrace cooperative action, and not merely as a 
matter of process. It may indeed demand a more general application of an approach akin to 
the compatibility requirement under Article 7 of the Fish Stocks Agreement.
12
  
The open seas also defy physical boundaries that can generally exclude persons from 
access to them. They are a common-pool natural resource, and so are difficult and costly to 
regulate.
13
 The seas sustain multiple uses, ranging from navigation to resource provision. 
This demands integrated and inclusive decision-making. The physical nature of the oceans 
places a high degree of inter-relationship between the oceans and the creatures living therein. 
Such resources, such as, for example, fish, are moveable and difficult to isolate from each 
other or from their habit unless extracted by capture, meaning that they cannot be readily 
reduced to exclusive control in their natural state. Marine living resources may be renewable, 
but we know that there are thresholds for exploitation, which if crossed will cause the 
degradation, collapse, and potential extinction of a resource.  
Marine ABNJ also comprise the sea-bed and its mineral resources, and, arguably, 
living resources around deep sea hydrothermal vent sites. The mineral resources are finite and 
exhaustible and so regulatory principles might be designed to direct users towards the most 
sustainable use patterns.
14
 Other resources in ABNJ, such as biodiversity, are inherently 
indivisible, shared goods. This may demand different kinds of regulatory principles. Here it is 
important to distinguish biodiversity from the components of biodiversity, such as individual 
species of fish. The latter are potentially subject to appropriation and may be subject to 
acquisition or individual control. In contrast, biodiversity is a non-exclusive attribute that 
transcends the individual components of biodiversity. All persons have an interest in 
biodiversity, but individuals cannot regulate it in isolation. Thus biodiversity „goods‟ in 
ABNJ demand positive obligations to cooperate, gather and share information, as well as 
potential constraints, on individual activities that may compromise biodiversity.
15
 
It should be apparent that the physical nature of marine ABNJ and the resources 
therein reinforce the need for cooperative and integrated regulation. Yet they also require 
principles that can adapt to their physical (including biogeochemical) exigencies. This 
strongly reinforces the importance of Oude Elferink‟s principles that encompass the 
ecosystem approach, the precautionary approach, an integrated approach, and the use of 
                                                   
11 R. Barnes, Property Rights and Natural Resources (Hart, Oxford, 2009), at 171. 
12 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) 34 ILM 1542. 
13 Barnes, supra note 11, at 1-3. 
14 This approach is considered by David Ong in respect of the continental shelf.  D. Ong, „Towards an 
International Law for the Conservation of Hydrocarbon Resources within the Continental Shelf?‟ in D. 
Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds.), Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2005), 93.   
15 See R. Barnes, „Fisheries and Biodiversity‟ in M. Fitzmaurice, D. Ong and P. Merkouris (eds.), Research 
Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010), 542-63. 
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science-based management. If regulation is to be aligned with the nature of a resource, then it 
must be based upon sound knowledge and good science. 
 The second test of governance principles is that of legal fit. Subject to the foregoing 
remarks about the physical alignment of regulatory principles, governance principles ought to 
be sensitive to limits inherent in current legal processes, such as the allocations of authority 
and the limits imposed by law as a concept. For example, principles should not require States 
to act ultra vires. It is notable that Oude Elferink mostly limits his discussion of the principles 
to ABNJ, treating it as a discrete legal space. But matters are not so simple. Oude Elferink is 
sensitive to the broader political context within which the regime of ABNJ is developing. As 
Treves has observed, the „high seas only‟ approach is the product of ideology and history, 
and ensures that the hard-fought extension of State sovereignty over sea areas is not 
threatened by incursions from institutions operating in ABNJ.
16
 However persuasive the 
arguments for the application of governance mechanisms that transcend such boundaries are, 
political will and legal boundaries seem to dictate otherwise.  
It must be observed that the limits of legal authority are not always well aligned to 
regulation of marine spaces, hence the difficulties in regulating straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks. Indeed, one could argue that any legal authority drawn without any 
regard to the nature of a thing is doomed to fail. We have all heard of the story of King 
Canute and his attempt to command the tides. In the present author‟s opinion, this strong 
regard for legal boundaries produces a degree of conflict within the logic of the principles. 
For example, Oude Elferink places much emphasis on the principle of integration, focusing 
on integration between different sectors, such as fisheries and pollution control, but at the 
same time limiting this principle spatially to ABNJ.
17
 Given the overlapping nature of the 
subject matter and the potential for transboundary interactions, it seems incongruous to 
ignore that integration should also operate spatially back into areas within national 
jurisdiction (AWNJ) and this should form an explicit part of this principle.
18
 At the very least 
it should provoke efforts to overcome the potential obstacles presented by capriciously drawn 
boundaries of legal authority. 
Another aspect of legal fit is the requirement that individual legal rules ought to form 
part of a coherent system of rules. This requires similar factual situations to be addressed by 
similar rules. For example, unless a rational distinction can be drawn between pollution of 
coastal waters and pollution in ABNJ, then a similar rule concerning liability for harm should 
apply to each instance of pollution. The requirement for coherence means that legal principles 
applicable to ABNJ ought to be consistent with principles for the law of the sea and 
international law in general. 
 Next is the question of the alignment of governance principles with fundamental 
moral values. If governance principles are aligned with fundamentally held values, then they 
will have a higher degree of legitimacy. All legal institutions are underpinned by a broader 
set of values, and it is useful to understand what these are and how they influence the 
institution. For example, it is widely acknowledged that property is justified according to a 
plurality of social values.
19
 Natural rights theory in the Lockean tradition demands that 
socially productive work is rewarded. In the liberal tradition, a high value is placed on 
governance mechanisms that protect the material and political agency of individuals. Under 
utilitarian theory, decisions are designed to maximise general welfare. Transcending these 
approaches is the idea that property rules should facilitate social order and be consistent and 
                                                   
16 Treves, supra note 3, at 12. 
17 See, however, the qualifying remarks in Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section on The Relationship Between 
Areas Within National Jurisdiction and ABNJ. 
18 See, for example, Article 142 of the LOSC. 
19 Barnes, supra note 11, chapter 2. 
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certain, so that future action may be planned. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to 
consider this further, but such values clearly have a role to play in testing the principles of 
governance for ABNJ. Such values might not be universal values, but they are certainly 
powerful, especially within Western legal traditions. The point is not to espouse a particular 
set of values, but rather to indicate that values should play a role in the design of legal 
institutions, including governance principles for ABNJ. 
 Two additional measures of the legitimacy of the principles are suggested. First, 
governance principles should be sensitive to questions of political authority. In its most 
simple form, this means that the principles must be something that can be realised in practice. 
This suggests a degree of pragmatism, and this may run counter to the previous call for 
„morally fitting‟ governance principles. However, there is clearly no point in designing a 
principle for which there is no political will. Thus, there seems little point in calling for the 
creation of a new supra-national agency that will manage ABNJ, at least for the present.  
It is notable that Oude Elferink was quite careful to draft the first principle in terms 
that guarded against a singular legal characterisation of ABNJ, given the well-known 
differences of opinion on the status of marine genetic resources. On the other hand, he more 
than dips his toe in the waters of institutional reform by considering quite seriously the idea 
of ocean stewardship. Political power is more often manifest in more subtle ways, and it is 
important to be sensitive to this also. For example, any government agency or department 
possesses a degree of independent personality and generates a degree of functional self-value. 
In practice such agencies may jealously guard their existing authority and seek to acquire 
more. This may make it difficult to secure agreement between different constituencies when 
there is the risk of a loss of authority. „Political fit‟ understood in these senses might not be 
the best driver of governance, but it does caution against being dangerously idealistic. 
 Finally, there is the question of intellectual fit. Developments in governance do not 
occur in an intellectual vacuum. The information, ideas and values that inform public debate 
and decision-making are readily drawn from various intellectual disciplines, e.g., science, 
politics, economic, law and so on. In the past there has been a tendency for the debate to stay 
within the secure realms of discrete epistemic communities. However, such divides are 
breaking down and there are demands for far greater integration and collaboration between 
different disciplines.
20
 It is suggested that this intellectual climate demands principles that 
embody integration between natural and social sciences, and that each has an important role 
to play in defining the scope and content of the principles.
21
 This is manifest in part in Oude 
Elferink‟s call for principles embodying science-based decision-making, the precautionary 
approach and the ecosystem approach.  
 
 
The Legal Status of the Principles of Oceans Governance 
 
It was noted above that principles ought to fit within existing legal structures. A further 
aspect of this looks at how the enumerated principles fit within or relate to the formal sources 
of international law. It is not immediately obvious where governance principles might lie. 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) refers to: 
 
“a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
                                                   
20 See, for example, the collection of essays from the International Foundation for Law of the Sea (IFLOS) 
Symposia reproduced in (2009) 24(2) IJMCL. 
21 This interdisciplinarity is a feature of resilience-based approaches.  See C. Folke, „Resilience: The Emergence 
of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analyses‟ (2006) 16(3) Global Environmental Change 253-67. 
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b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;” 
 
If we read further into the exposition of the principles by Oude Elferink, we clearly see a 
deliberate effort to locate them within existing rules of treaty law and, in particular, the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). To this extent, the principles 
might merely be regarded as a reiteration of various rules of treaty law. I think, however, that 
this is not enough. If this were the case, then this simply repeats the existence of existing 
obligations under international law. They are binding on States party to the relevant 
agreement(s), and may have wider effect if they meet the requirements of Articles 34-38 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and produce legal effects for third States, or 
form part of customary international law. The principles might constitute rules of customary 
international law of a rather general nature.  
Locating such principles in custom has the immediate advantage of establishing 
general rules that are binding on all States, and this seems to be of fundamental importance in 
the development of a legal regime for the regulation of a global commons that all States are 
entitled to access and utilise. This would require Oude Elferink to demonstrate that each and 
every principle manifests the requirements of customary international law. This may be the 
case for many manifestations of each principle, but I do not propose to categorically review 
that status of each principle in terms of its customary status.
22
 This is not to deny that some of 
the principles discussed are in fact rules of customary international law, or that particular 
manifestations of the principles are part of customary international law. However, the 
important point here is that the principles are principles, and not merely rules.  
Reading the Report as a whole, it is clear that Oude Elferink wants to do something 
more, or perhaps less, than list existing rules or treaty law or custom. The principles are not 
intended to simply reconstitute strictly binding rules of law for application to ABNJ, and so 
the principles might be viewed as a poor relation of binding laws. But, on the other hand, they 
would appear to possess a more nuanced directive quality, capable of shaping a range of more 
precise rules, and so are more than mere rules. There is an important distinction between 
rules and principles, which needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the function of the 
principles. 
 
A rule [...] is essentially practical and, moreover, binding; there are rules of art as 
there are rules of government, while a principle expresses a general truth, which 
guides our action, serves as a theoretical basis for the various acts of our life, and the 




I shall return to this distinction in more detail below, but first it is useful to comment on the 
third source of international law: the category of general principles.  
 The precise nature and function of general principles of law is a much debated topic.
24
 
This is despite the fact that general principles find a place in most legal systems. One view is 
that such principles are rules accepted in the municipal law of all „civilised‟ States. A more 
nuanced view is that they authorise the ICJ to apply “principles of municipal jurisprudence, 
                                                   
22 Various principles have been considered in more detail by other writers.  See, for example, A. Trouwborst, 
Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2002). 
23 Gentini case (1903).  Cited in B. Cheng, General Principles of International Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1953), at 24. 
24 See further, B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Grotius, 
1987). 
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insofar as they are applicable to the relations of States.”
25
 Resort to such principles was a 
more common feature of international adjudication in the nineteenth century. This reflected 
the fact that international law was a less complete system and recourse to such principles was 
necessary in order to prevent a non liquet. It is notable that in the twentieth century, the ICJ 
has had little occasion to refer to general principles to resolve the disputes before it. This is 
because rules of custom and treaty generally provide a sufficient basis for a decision. It may 
also be because the ICJ is conservative in its application of rules derived from positive law, 
so as not to threaten its consent-based jurisdiction.
26
 Discrete from general principles 
narrowly construed, Brownlie also lists as a source “general principles of international law”.
27
 
These appear to include rules of custom and logical propositions resulting from judicial 
reasoning. However, they have a distinct identity: 
 
“In many cases these principles are to be traced to state practice. However, they are 
primarily abstractions from the mass of rules and have been so long and so generally 




 It is notable that the leading text on the law of the sea acknowledges a minor role for 
the category. The authors take the view that the “rather vague category of „general principles 
of international law‟ is not of great significance for the law of the sea”.
29
 They go on to note 
that certain principles are of profound importance to the law of the sea, such as freedom of 
the high seas. However, they suggest that these are better categorised as principles of custom. 
These are distinct from commonly accepted general principles, such as estoppel or audi 
alteram partem, which have strongly influenced the procedural administration of 
international law. The treatment of principles in this way reaffirms Brownlie‟s view that the 
sources of international law cannot be rigidly classified.  
 A useful, threefold classification of legal principles is provided by de Sadeleer.
30
 
First, he lists the general summaries of the law as presented by academic scholars. Second are 
general principles of legal logic, such as the lex specialis derogat legi generali rule, which 
are better regarded as interpretative tools. Finally are general principles that have been 
created by courts to provide greater coherence to the legal system and fill gaps or remove 
obscurity within the legal system. It is this third category that provides the more useful 
starting point for our analysis. Principles in this third sense play a crucial role by providing 
coherence to a legal system. They provide a means of ordering more specific legal rules, and 
of ensuring a degree of consistency within legal systems. For example, a general principle 
may be the polluter-pays principle. Within the umbrella of the general principle may be 
numerous specific rules, dictating, for example, that a ship-owner is strictly liable for damage 
caused by the release of oil resulting from a collision, or that a fisherman is responsible for 
using fishing gear that causes damage to habitats. The individual rules share a familiar 
resemblance and may be subject to shared constraints and modes of operation. New rules, or 
the application of existing rules to new situations, may be evaluated according to the extent 
that they fall within the general principle, or share common traits with analogous rules. A 
                                                   
25 R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford,  
2008), vol. I, at 37. 
26 W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens and Sons, London, 1964), at 189. 
27 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6 th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), at 18-9. 
28 Ibid., at 19. 
29 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rded. (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999), 
at 12. 
30 N. De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles. From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002), at 236. 
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court faced with the application of a rule may refer to the general principle underlying the 
rule to help determine its proper meaning.  
 A general principle is induced from a mass of specific rules. This approach is 
followed by Oude Elferink. Care must be taken here if we are to accept principles of law 
induced from State practice; then there is always the risk that the principle is advanced 
without due attention to the body of law that supports it. It would hardly be permissible to 
assert a general principle that was derived from a custom that in itself was not clearly 
supported by evidence of sufficient State practice. A cautionary tale here is the treatment of 
sustainable development by the ICJ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case.
31
 The ICJ referred to 
the „concept‟ of sustainable development, not the principle, without further relying upon it as 
the basis for its judgment. Although Weeramantry strongly advocated the existence of a 
customary principle in his Dissenting Opinion,
32
 Lowe has more convincingly argued that the 
concept lacks a fundamentally norm-creating character.
33
 In this sense it is better regarded as 
part of a framework within which decisions can be made. This is not critical to the exercise of 
advancing a list of principles of oceans governance, but it does caution against an 
unsophisticated view of their normative relevance.  
 It is interesting to note that Oude Elferink refrains from adopting a formal definition 
of the term „governance principle‟. He is clearly sensitive to the complexities and 
complications that follow from any such definition. Instead he settles for a working definition 
that conceives of governance principles as guiding States and other actors in adopting and 
implementing specific rules or approaches in respect of activities in ABNJ.
34
 The only 
threshold used to calibrate such principles is the quality of „bindingness‟, which in itself is 
somewhat mutable.  
 
Some Observations on the Governance Principles 
 
As Oude Elferink notes, there is little need to formulate a list of principles of oceans 
governance from scratch. One or other of the principles and, quite often, most of the 
principles have been iterated elsewhere.
35
 Such principles are not merely the views of 
academics, but are also being advanced by States, and this is surely the most important test of 
their normative relevance.  
 
Respect for the Law of the Sea, in Particular the LOSC and Related Instruments 
 
At first glance, this call for respect for the law of the sea suggests something analogous to the 
rule of law, as applied to ABNJ. This would seem a strong first choice for a governance 
principle. However, Oude Elferink seems to struggle to pin this principle down, and 
ultimately suggests that it might be phrased thus: “The international law of the sea establishes 
a comprehensive legal order for areas beyond national jurisdiction”. There is nothing wrong 
with this statement, evincing a general truth about the law of the sea. It does, however, seem 
to lack the normative force one might expect of a principle, and one wonders whether it 
might be better restated as: “States shall respect the comprehensive order for the law of the 
                                                   
31 (1997) ICJ Rep. 7. 
32 Weeramantry,  Dissenting Opinion, ibid., at 92 et seq., especially at 104. 
33 A.V. Lowe, „Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments‟ in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), 
International Law and Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford, 
University Press, Oxford, 1999), 19 and 25. 
34 Oude Elferink, supra note 1. 
35 See, for example, D. Freestone, „Modern Principles of High Seas Governance - The Legal Underpinnings‟ 
(2009) 39 Environmental Policy and Law 44-9.  
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sea that applies to areas beyond national jurisdiction”. A further point, which is not raised by 
Oude Elferink in his principle, is the issue of compliance, particularly through the mechanism 
of flag State jurisdiction. Most activities in ABNJ are carried out by private persons, who are 
subject to the control of flag States. Unfortunately, the mechanism of flag State control is 
imperfect, either because of the practical problems of securing compliance, or the lack of 
political will by certain flag States to properly control the activities of vessels flying their 
flag. This is a significant and generally understood governance gap, and one that would 
usefully be filled by an explicit governance principle. 
Closer reading of the commentary suggests a more nuanced content, since Oude 
Elferink combines a potential number of principles under this first heading. He begins by 
discussing the conditional freedom of the high seas, as contained in Article 87 of the LOSC. 
This much seems uncontroversial as it applies to the high seas, especially the strong emphasis 
on the conditionality of this principle. What is interesting to note is that freedom of the high 
seas imports substantive values into the governance principles, since it implies a substantive 
right of access to certain marine spaces and resources. It is not merely about decision-making, 
unless it is read as a right not to be excluded from participation in a regime in general. This 
careful handling of the freedom of the high seas is unsurprising, not least because it may 
generate concerns when juxtaposed with the common heritage principle that applies to the 
seabed. Given this substantive element to the principle, it is not surprising that much 
emphasis is placed on its conditionality. There is also force in the argument that the 
conditional freedom is to be treated as a dynamic principle, facilitated by the general rule of 
reference in Article 87. The same point is reiterated for Articles 138 and 235.  
It may be recalled that the law of the sea is part of international law and is subject to 
the same systemic requirements that constrain and shape general international law.
36
 The 
freedom of the high seas is subject to general systemic requirements of international law, 
such as restrictions on the use of force and protection of human rights. There is nothing 
special about the freedom that excludes such fundamental concerns. At this point one can 
begin to appreciate the importance of the principle of integration, which makes explicit such 
complex interactions and the need for coherence and consistency in a legal system. 
 Oude Elferink goes on to state that the conditional freedom is to be fulfilled in good 
faith. The principle of good faith is not limited to the application of the freedom of the high 
seas. It is a distinct principle, of general application but with contextual meaning.
37
 The 
requirement to act in good faith is one of the most fundamental principles of international 
law.
38
 It has a long history, being reiterated in a range of cases, from the North Coast Atlantic 
Fisheries case
39
 to the Shrimp Turtle case.
40
 It also appears in the Article 2(2) of the United 
Nations Charter and the Declaration of Friendly Principles.
41
 The principle is manifest in the 
doctrine of abuse of rights, pacta sunt servanda and, perhaps most germane to environmental 
                                                   
36 See further A. Boyle, „Further Development of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea‟ in Freestone et al. 
(eds.), supra note 14, at 40. 
37 See the Case Concerning the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO und Egypt 
(1980) ICJ Rep. 96, at para. 49. 
38 As the ICJ has observed, good faith is “one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of 
legal obligations".  The Nuclear Tests cases (1974) ICJ Rep. 268, para. 46. 
39 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain, United States) 7 Sept 1910. Reproduced in RIAA, 
vol. XXI, 167 at 187-9. 
40 Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, para 158. Reproduced in 
(1999) 38 ILM 118. 
41 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States 
in Accordance with International Law, UN GA Res. 2625/XXV, 24 Oct. 1970. 
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issues, duties of consultation and prior notification,
42
 and management of shared or common 
resources.
43
 Finally, it may be noted that the principle is a qualifying requirement, and not a 
source of obligation itself. States must act in good faith in respect of some existing 
commitment.
44
 So in the context of a specific treaty obligation, it “obliges the Parties to apply 
it in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized”.
45
 This clearly 
alludes to some quality of process in decision-making – the decision must be reasonable. 
More generally, reasonableness is used to constrain the factors that can be used to reach a 
decision. In public law it seeks to delimit the factors that are relevant in reaching a decision.
46
 
This approach applies equally to international adjudication and decision-making.
47
 More 
might be said about the meaning and content of good faith, but for present purposes it is 
sufficient to show how it opens up possibilities for calibrating decision-making and could 
begin to influence the governance of ABNJ. Given this meaning of the principle to act in 
good faith, one wonders whether it might be restated as a distinct governance principle for 
ABNJ, rather than finding itself packaged up with this particular principle.  
 
The Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment 
 
The second principle requires States to “protect and preserve the marine environment of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction”. It is notable that it appears to be a principle of substance rather 
than process. That it is concerned with the idea of preventing harm to an area of common 
concern, rather than the distribution of resources, means that it is more readily acceptable. 
Oude Elferink is unequivocally right to assert that there can be no doubt that the general 
obligation of States to protect and preserve the marine environment reflects general 
international law.
48
 It extends to all oceans and parts of the sea, both within and beyond 
national jurisdiction. There is scope to refer to other potential authorities for this principle, 
including Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
49
 and the various Regional Seas agreements.
50
  
One also wonders whether the principle could have been couched in terms of due 
diligence. This would require States to ensure that not only their own conduct was in 
conformity with the principle, but also that of any actors or agents over which they have 
effective control.
51
 This seems particularly important in the context of activities in the Area, 
                                                   
42 See P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell International Law and the Environment, 3rd ed. (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009), at 177. 
43 In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ noted how certain general obligations were to be “transformed into specific 
obligations of performance through a process of consultation and negotiation. Their implementation thus 
requires a mutual willingness to discuss in good faith actual and potential environmental risks.” See supra note 
31, para. 112. 
44 Border and Transborder Armed Actions case (1988) ICJ Rep. 69, at 105. 
45 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 31, at para. 142. 
46 See T.R. Hickman, „The Reasonableness Principle: Reassessing Its Place in the Public Sphere‟ (2004) 63 
Cambridge Law Journal 166. 
47 See the Advisory Opinion on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entites 
with Respect to Activities in the Area., paras. 229-30. ITLOS case No. 17 of 1 Feb. 2011.  Available online at 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf (Area Advisory Opinion). 
48 Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section on The Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, 
Discussion. 
49 A/CONF.151/26 (vol. III), 13 August 1992. Reproduced in A.V. Lowe and S.A.G. Talmon, The Legal Order 
of the Oceans (Hart, Oxford, 2009), 459. 
50 See, for example, the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
1992, (1993) 23 LOSB 32.  It is notable that OSPAR has been actively engaged in the protection of ABNJ.  See 
the Bergen Statement of the Ministerial Meeting of the OSPAR Commission, 23-24 September 2010.  Available 
at http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/news/ospar_2010_bergen_statement.pdf. 
51 See the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (2010) ICJ Rep. 1, para. 197. 
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which will most likely be conducted by private companies.
52
 As noted above, ensuring that 
non-State actors comply with the international law of the sea is one of the key governance 
issues for ABNJ. 
 Some further supporting evidence for the general principle is provided by the rules of 
reference in Articles 207-212 of the LOSC, which link the general obligation to the creation 
of generally accepted international rules and standards. Although Article 215 seems to detach 
the Area from the general requirements of Part XII, the general approach is restated in Article 
145, which requires the adoption of rules to protect the marine environment of the Area. In 
any case the point of a general principle, as outlined above, is to provide a means of directing 
the regulation of a subject matter. Thus it guides the development of rules of environmental 
protection of ABNJ in light of rules developed in AWNJ and more generally. In this sense it 
also serves to reinforce the principle of integration. Thus it forms part of a network of related 




The duty to cooperate is not limited to the law of the sea. It is a general principle of 
international law that States cooperate with each other. As such, one can refer to a far greater 
array of instruments and decisions to reaffirm the existence of this principle.
53
 Such 
authorities aside, it is manifest in the simple fact that States regularly cooperate with each 
other. As such there is little doubt that such a principle must apply to ABNJ. What is more 
interesting is to try to ascertain the meaning of the duty. 
 Oude Elferink takes a rather liberal approach to cooperation. Thus States are “in the 
best position to establish the exact content of the cooperation that is required of them”.
54
 This 
reflects the need for flexibility in the means of cooperation, but also the fact that the duty 
does not appear to be well developed under international law beyond a simple obligation of 
process. In this respect, the duty to cooperate is notoriously limited. As the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) noted in the Advisory Opinion on Railway Traffic between 
Lithuania and Poland, “the obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an 
agreement”.
55
 That said, there are some indications that cooperation is more than a minimal 
form of engagement between States. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ 
stressed that “the parties are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the 
negotiations are meaningful.”
56
 More recently, the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) noted in the Mox Plant case:  
 
the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the 
marine environment under Part XII of the Convention and general international law 
and that rights arise there from which the Tribunal may consider appropriate to 




                                                   
52 See Article 139(1) of the LOSC.  Also, see Area Advisory Opinion, para. 108; supra note 47.   
53 See, for example, Article 3 of the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN GA Res. 3281 
(XXIX) 1974, A/RES/29/3281; UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct on Shared Natural Resources 1978, 
reproduced in (1978) 17 ILM 1097; Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Use of International 
Watercourses 1997, (1997) 36 ILM 719.  
54 Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section on International Cooperation, Formulation and Core Content of the 
Principle.  
55 (1931) PCIJ Rep. Ser.A/B, No. 42, 108, at 116. 
56 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment (1969) ICJ Rep. 47, para. 85). 
57 Mox Plant case (ITLOS: UK v. Ireland), Request for Provisional Measures, ITLOS Reports 2001, 82. 
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The ITLOS then prescribed provisional measures requiring consultation and exchange of 
information.
58
 In the same case, the importance of cooperation was further stressed by 
Wolfrum in his Separate Opinion: “The obligation to cooperate with other States whose 
interests may be affected is a Grundnorm of Part XII of the Convention, as of customary 




[t]he duty to cooperate denotes an important shift in the general orientation of the 
international legal order. It balances the principle of sovereignty of States and thus 
ensures that community interests are taken into account vis-à-vis individualistic State 
interests. It is a matter of prudence and caution as well as in keeping with the 
overriding nature of the obligation to co-operate that the parties should engage therein 




In this sense the duty is not just the means by which States advance their interests; it 
is the means by which community interests emerge and may be protected. This seems 
particularly important in ABNJ, where actions directly concern the international community 
and not merely neighbouring States. In the Land Reclamation case, the ITLOS did not accede 
to Malaysia‟s request to be furnished with a range of information pertaining to certain 
projects, and to be allowed to comment thereon. However, it did require the parties to 
establish a group of experts with the authority to study the effects of land reclamation, and to 
propose measures to deal with any adverse consequences.
61
 Such a measure was justified 
according to the overriding importance of a duty to cooperate in respect of the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. In the same case the ITLOS also referred to prompt 




 It might be possible to further specify the modalities of the duty in greater detail, for 
example, by noting the purpose of cooperation, and not simply leaving it “in respect of 
ABNJ”. This could be done by explicitly linking it to the other principles. One idea would be 
to make use of the general requirement to inform other States of activities that may have an 
impact upon ABNJ, whether potentially harmful or not. States should furnish each other with 
information as far as is reasonable or appropriate, since unless such information is made 
available, States cannot ascertain whether or not their interests might be engaged and some 
form of cooperation or involvement in an activity required. Article 142 of the LOSC requires 
prior notification and consultation with coastal States where deposits straddle national 
boundaries, but it would be odd if no such general requirement exists where other interests of 
States might be at stake. In this sense the duty might also extend as far as establishing the 
grounds for meaningful cooperation.  
A final observation is that the obligation is not limited to States, but is one that is 
systemic. As there are intergovernmental organisations and other actors engaged in activities 
in ABNJ, the duty to cooperate should extend equally to such agencies. It operates between 
international organisations, and between States and international organisations.
63
 Even if the 
latter are not directly subject to rules of international law, the requirement of cooperation is 
                                                   
58 Ibid., at para 89. 
59 Available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/sep.op.Wolfrum.E.orig.pdf. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), 
Request for Provisional Measures, 8 October  2003, para. 106. ITLOS case No. 12. Available online at 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_12/Order.08.10.03.E.pdf.  
62 Ibid., at para. 98. 
63 See J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), chapter 7. 
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generally extended to such agencies through other mechanisms. This is the case for private 
contractors under the Deep Seabed Mining Regulations.
64
 
 The importance of cooperation for the governance of ABNJ is axiomatic, given the 
fact that cooperation is really the only means by which activities can be effectively regulated 
in ABNJ. A failure of States to agree on the means of cooperation would significantly limit 
the development of any more detailed regime and the proper coordination and control of 
activities in ABNJ. The willingness of dispute settlement fora to direct particular forms of 
cooperation, in light of other overarching principles, indicates the value of not just 
governance principles, but also of governance mechanisms and institutions.  
 
A Science-based Approach to Management 
 
As indicated above, there should be a science-based approach to management of activities in 
ABNJ. This much follows from the argument that the principles must be responsive to the 
physical nature of the regulatory subject matter and that science reveals this. Oude Elferink‟s 
commentary refers to Article 119 of the LOSC, as well as a general reference to the Fish 
Stocks Agreement, but mainly draws upon Article 201.
65
 Other potential points of reference 
include Article 6.4 of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,
66
 Article 2 of 
OSPAR, Articles 3(5), 20 and 24 of the Helsinki Convention,
67
 and Chapter 17.25 of Agenda 
21. Indeed, research and the sharing of information is a key feature of regional fisheries 
management organisations and instruments concerning the protection of the marine 
environment, as well as institutions such as the Arctic Council and the Antarctic Treaty 
System. It might be stated as an axiom that regulation is knowledge-dependent. However, this 
is not to say that a science-based approach is the same in each instance. 
It is notable that Oude Elferink‟s commentary is silent on the threshold of what 
constitutes an acceptable standard of science for management purposes. This is probably 
because it is a notoriously difficult standard both to establish and demand of all States. It is 
also problematic for the ultimate bearers of the duty to provide the evidence basis for 
decisions - that is to say the individual scientists and research institutes engaged in marine 
scientific research. In the present writer‟s opinion there is a strong sense that  the legal 
requirements for the provision of the science that provides the evidence base for management 
are insufficiently clear. This is notoriously the case in respect of the EU Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive and the focus on measuring complex environmental conditions, 
designing mechanisms capable of monitoring human impacts on the environment and the 
consequences of regulatory responses to such activities.
68
  
There is also a wider concern about how such science can be defended against critical 
scrutiny. This stems directly from the fact that science does not provide absolute truths. It 
comprises propositions accepted as valid until disputed and proven to be incorrect. The 
commentary refers to “appropriate science”, and indicates that this suggests that the science 
must meet a certain standard. This is certainly desirable since there is no point on relying 
upon bad, poor or incomplete science. However, I am not sure this is the only, or the intended 
                                                   
64 See Regulation 31(4) and (6) of the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in 
the Area. Available online at http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/PN-en.pdf. Also Regulations 5(3), 
33(6), and 34(1) of the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area. 
Available online at http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/PolymetallicSulphides.pdf.  See also clause 
5 of the standard mining contracts annexed to each set of the Regulations. 
65 Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section on A Science-based Approach To Management . 
66 Available online at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM. 
67 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 1992, 2099 UNTS 197. 
68 See T. Markus, S. Schlacke and N. Maier, „Legal Implementation of Integrated Ocean Policies: The EU‟s 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive‟ (2011) 26 IJMCL 59. 
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meaning of „appropriate‟. It may also be read as a qualifier, and one wonders whether this 
might actually allow States more leeway to use a less rigorous quality of science where they 
deem it appropriate, for example, on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.  
 Although science is desirable for, or rather fundamental to oceans governance, a strict 
reading of the LOSC shows it only to possess a rather facultative role. The LOSC requires 
standards to be established in light of information gathered under Article 200, but it does not 
require States to go beyond the requirements of Article 200. It merely allows them to do so. 
This is a less than stringent demand for recourse to a particular standard of science. As I 
indicated earlier, the fact that principles should be sensitive to the physical qualities of the 
regulatory subject matter reinforces the central role of science in the management of ABNJ. 
Given the contingent nature of science, this principle needs to be dynamically structured. The 
state of knowledge about the environment or of science generally influences the construction 
of other principles, such as the responsibility to protect the environment. Thus the ITLOS 
notes that the content of a due diligence obligation “may change over time as measures 
considered sufficiently diligent at a certain moment may become not diligent enough in light, 
for instance, of new scientific or technological knowledge”.
69
 States should take a progressive 
and ongoing approach to the development and improvement of science, and adapt their 
conduct accordingly. 
As a final word on the principle of science-based management, Oude Elferink‟s 
explanatory note refers initially to the protection of the environment. It then goes on to 
provide for a “science-based approach to the management of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction”. It should be reiterated that such management applies to all activities, such as 
fishing and mining, in ABNJ, and not merely to those that may have an adverse impact on the 
marine environment per se. 
 
The Precautionary Approach 
 
Oude Elferink‟s fifth principle provides that “States shall apply the precautionary approach in 
ABNJ”.
70
 The principle is reaffirmed not merely by the existence of specific rules on the use 
of precaution under general international law, but is also a product of the limited knowledge 
we have about the state of the environment and its resources in ABNJ, and that we must 
accommodate such uncertainties in the management process. As such it is strongly linked to 
the previous principle.  
Oude Elferink induces the principle from a range of obligations and treaty provisions 
under international law, as well as domestic law, and little can be usefully added to this. In 
any case, the issue is not so much the existence of the principle/approach, but the way in 
which it is implemented. International law prescribes a general requirement for its use, but 
does not specify its particular modalities in any given context. This is because its operation is 
highly contingent. That said, its operation clearly relates to other defined conditions, such as 
the use of particular standards of scientific evidence in decision-making.  
A contextual approach poses few difficulties when the principle/approach is applied 
to AWNJ. There is clearly scope for variations in its application, depending upon the capacity 
of the State and its administrative agencies, availability of resources, and the extent of any 
knowledge basis in respect of the activity, as well as the scale and potential impact of the 
activity. However, in ABNJ, the fact that the spaces and resources are common, with multiple 
actors engaged in similar activities, suggests that highly localised practices might be 
unsuitable. This suggests that States could adopt a more consistent approach to its 
                                                   
69 Area Advisory Opinion, supra note 47, para. 117. 
70 Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section on The Precautionary Approach. 
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application. It would seem odd that different manifestations of the precautionary principle 
could arise in respect of similar activities in ABNJ. This would open the door for different 
standards of conduct. Indeed, the requirement for consistent application of governance 




The Ecosystem Approach 
 
As with the precautionary principle, the ecosystem approach is closely related to the 
requirement for science-based management.
72
 There is little doubt that it is a key feature of 
contemporary marine environmental management regimes, and required by a number of 
binding and non-binding instruments.
73
 My key observation on this principle links to the 
following points about integration. That is to say that it requires an inclusive approach to 
regulation and should not be given a narrow application purely to ABNJ.
74
 By definition the 
approach runs counter to a strict respect for formal legal boundaries and requires approaches 
that address a natural system as a whole. This does not permit States to act beyond their 
authority, but rather requires cooperation in order to ensure that management fits the nature 
of the subject matter rather than be limited by formal allocations of competence.  
 
The Integrated Approach 
 
There is little doubt that oceans must be governed in an integrated manner. Habitat protection 
requires consideration of the impacts of shipping and fishing activities, pollution control 
requires certain standards to be applied to the construction and operation of ships and 
offshore mining installations, and so on. Only through such an approach can we assess and 
address the cumulative impacts of human activities in ABNJ. An integrated approach is 
particularly evident under recently developed national marine regulatory regimes and is a 
growing trend in maritime regulation.
75
  
Oude Elferink is correct to note that whilst the LOSC aspires to an integrated 
approach in its Preamble, the fact is that the bulk of its rules and principles retain a highly 
sectoral focus. At best, the LOSC tends to indirectly or partially accommodate an integrated 
approach. This tends to arise when multiple activities occur within the same spatial area.
76
 In 
his commentary, Oude Elferink refers mainly to pollution and the idea of integrated pollution 
control. This has been relatively well developed under environmental law more generally, so 
the focus is understandable.
77
 This might seem to downplay the importance of spatial 
                                                   
71 K.M. Gjerde, H. Dotinga, S. Harp, E.J. Molenaar, R. Rayfuse and R. Warner, Regulatory and Governance 
Gaps in the International Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas 
Beyond National Jurisdiction (IUCN, Gland, Switzerland, 2008).  
72 See S.M. Garcia, „Governance, Science and Society: The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries‟ in R. Quentin 
Grafton, R. Hilborm, D. Squires, M. Tait and M. Williams (eds.), Handbook of Marine Fisheries Conservation 
and Management (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), 76. 
73 See for example, Article 6 of the FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 66. 
74 See infra. 
75 See, for example, the English and Welsh Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, c. 23.  Available  at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/23/contents.  Also see the EU Plan for an Integrated Maritime Policy  
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76 See, for example, the relationship between resource activities and shipping implicit in LOSC Articles 56(2), 
59, and 60(7), and the notion of due regard in respect of the exercise of high seas freedoms under LOSC Article 
87(2). 
77 The approach is quite well developed under EU law.  See B. Lange, Implementing EU Pollution Control: Law 
and Integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008).   
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integration between ABNJ and AWNJ. In this respect one should note the more explicit 
reference to spatially integrated approaches in Article 195 of the LOSC, which provides that: 
 
[in] taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution, States shall act so as not 
to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or 
transform one type of pollution into another. 
 
One might also refer to Article 7 of the Fish Stocks Agreement, which requires that 
“[c]onservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted 
for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible”. Furthermore, Article 142 of the 
LOSC requires that: 
 
[a]ctivities in the Area, with respect to resource deposits in the Area which lie across 
limits of national jurisdiction, shall be conducted with due regard to the rights and 
legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose jurisdiction such deposits.‟ 
 
Spaces within and beyond national jurisdiction do not exist in isolation from the wider 
environment and resource systems. The idea of integrated management across this boundary 
is not disregarded by Oude Elferink, but neither is it explicitly mentioned at this point.  
Rather it is left to a general caveat in the section on the relationship between AWNJ and 
ABNJ.  This approach seems to puts a higher degree of weight on political factors rather than 
on natural factors in the design of governance mechanisms. It might also result in a rather 
one-directional process, whereby strong interests of coastal States are used to influence the 
management of ABNJ, but interests emerging in respect of ABNJ are not influencing 
domestic management regimes.  
To ensure that integration is „full‟ integration, it is suggested that spatial integration 
be a key requirement of this principle. At the very least, there seems to be merit in 
articulating this principle of integration in such a way that it „opens the door‟ to a wider 
potential application. Thus the principle might be restated: “States shall, as appropriate, apply 
compatible approaches to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and 
sustainable use of resources within and beyond areas of national jurisdiction”.  
 
Sustainable and Equitable Use 
 
This principle advances a substantive goal, rather than a procedural approach. The law of the 
sea requires something like the sustainable use of living resources, although this is phrased in 
rather different terms, such as the somewhat contentious concepts of maximum sustainable 
yield and optimum utilization.
78
 The commentary to this principle focuses on intra-
generational equity, although it ultimately embraces the needs of future generations.
79
 This is 
in line with the idea of sustainable development. Equity is seen to embrace questions of 
access, benefit-sharing and capacity-building, which provide starting points in deciding how 
best to use and distribute resources located in ABNJ. It is not as clear how sustainable use or 
equitable use might apply to non-living resources of the Area, given their finite nature. 
Although I find myself in agreement with this principle, in general terms, I am 
concerned about the inherently contestable nature of both sustainability and equity as 
principles. There is a place for the principle, but there is much work to do to flesh out how it 
can shape specific decisions on resource use. Indeed, as Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell point 
                                                   
78 See LOSC, Article 119, but also Articles 61-4.  
79 Oude Elferink, supra note 1,  Section on Sustainable and Equitable Use. 
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out, since equitable use requires a balancing of interests between interested parties, it is less 





Public Availability of Information 
 
As indicated in the context of the principle on cooperation, good governance requires 
availability of information. This not only improves the evidence basis for decision-making, it 
helps to encourage participation in and appreciation of decision-making. This in turn 
strengthens the legitimacy of the governance mechanisms.  
Apart from the general references to the Rio Declaration and the Aarhus Convention, 
and the specific citing of Articles 204-6 of the LOSC, the Report states that other provisions 
of the LOSC require information to be made available, and perhaps support the principle, 
including Articles 119(2) and 143. The former requires sharing scientific information about 
high seas fishing activities through regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements. This information must be provided regularly, but only as deemed appropriate, 
indicating that the obligation to disseminate information is not unqualified.  
Somewhat detailed information-sharing requirements in the deep seabed mining 
context are provided for by Article 143. Again this is facilitated institutionally, through the 
International Seabed Authority. There is a strong emphasis on promotion of research, and 
specific modalities of supporting research are indicated. This goes beyond mere research to 
capacity-building.  
These provisions in respect of fisheries on the high seas and mineral exploitation in 
the Area may not go quite as far as Article 205, since there are explicit requirements to ensure 
that the information becomes publicly available, but they do indicate the pervasive 
requirement of information availability in good governance regimes. 
 
Transparent and Open Decision-making Processes 
 
As Oude Elferink notes, this principle is less well grounded in the LOSC than it is in the Fish 
Stocks Agreement. This perhaps reflects the wider changes in perceptions about the 
requirements of proper decision-making procedures that have developed since the adoption of 
the LOSC in 1982. There has been a broader change in the perception of how public 
decision-making should be conducted and this now demands a degree of participation by a 
wider range of stakeholders. Although this represents a challenge to the traditionally State-
centric view of international law, one could argue that the requirement to ensure transparent 
and open decision-making flows from the basic principle of good faith and so it is well rooted 
in international law. It could also be regarded as a fundamental attribute of the rule of law.
81
 
As with the previous principle, it contributes to the broader legitimacy of decisions, and this 
in turn may help improve compliance.  
Openness may also increase the scope for improving management, because a broader 
category of participants can bring alternative insights into questions of resource use and 
management.
82
 This much is alluded to in the International Law Association (ILA) 
Resolution on Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development, which notes that “[p]ublic 
participation is essential to sustainable development and good governance in that it is a 
                                                   
80 Birnie et al., supra note 42, at 201. 
81 See for example, J. Ebbesson, „The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law‟ 
(1997) 8 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 51. 
82 J. Ebbesson, „The Rule of Law in Governance of Complex Socio-ecological Changes‟ (2010) 20 Global 
Environmental Change 414. 
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condition for responsive, transparent and accountable governments as well as a condition for 
the active engagement of equally responsive, transparent and accountable civil society 
organizations, including industrial concerns and trade unions.”
83
  
Transparency is pervasive and applies to all aspects of the regulatory process. Indeed, 
the ITLOS raised the requirement of transparency in the Area Advisory Opinion to buttress its 
arguments in favour of sponsoring States adopting reasonable and non-arbitrary regulatory 
measures rather than relying upon contractual measures to ensure their compliance.
84
 The 
ITLOS observed that a purely contractual approach would be insufficient. Since contracts 
may not be publicly available, so it would be difficult to verify that States had met their 
obligations to ensure compliance and liability for damage under Article 139. 
 
The Responsibility of States as Stewards of the Global Marine Environment 
 
The starting point for this principle is the proposition that States have a responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause harm to the 
environment.
85
 This much seems relatively uncontroversial, embodying as it does the well-
accepted sic utere principle. Oude Elferink‟s commentary then goes on to develop the notion 
of due diligence as a matter of State responsibility. This was considered above and it clearly 
has a role to play in guiding States‟ responsibilities in ABNJ. The question remains whether a 
general responsibility of stewardship can be extrapolated from this proposition. Whilst I think 
that the notion of stewardship should have a role to play, the principle needs to be more 
widely grounded in a range of practice.
86
 Indeed, as Oude Elferink notes, the core 
significance of stewardship rather is concerned with responsible use of the environment and 
all types of resources. Stewardship thus has affinity with the principles of sustainable and 
equitable use and the principle of international cooperation. Stewardship is not merely about 
prevention of harm, it is also about preservation and conservation of resources and, more 
importantly, it involves questions of ownership and allocation of resources.
87
  
The commentary then indicates a range of forms it may take, from the articulation of a 
common concern, to a stronger form of trusteeship, based on the public trust doctrine, while 
seeming to prefer the former approach. In this sense it legitimises the „interests‟ of a wider 
range of actors in the governance of matters that might otherwise have been regarded as 
subject to exclusive sovereignty. This avoids the difficulties that are associated with a more 
substantive notion of stewardship that encompasses questions of resource use and access, 
favouring instead a more procedural approach that requires, in some unspecified way, some 
means of including interests in a decision-making process. 
 This advances a rather weak form of stewardship and it does not seem to add much to 
the foregoing principles. The meaning and content of stewardship need to be defined more 
carefully, as do the precise means by which it operates. If stewardship is a responsibility, then 
does this entail rights that can be used to secure compliance with stewardship duties? This 
question of how to hold States to account for stewardship is crucial. Stewardship requires a 
high degree of institutional support since it entails the existence of complex divisions of 
responsibility and accountability. Unfortunately, in a strongly decentralised system like 
                                                   
83 ILA Resolution 3/2002, para 5.1.  Available online at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/25 
84 Area Advisory Opinion, supra note 47, paras. 223-6. 
85 Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section on The Responsibility of States as Stewards of the Global Marine 
Environment. 
86 See, for example, Articles 87(2), 116 and 193 of the LOSC, and Article 6.1 of the FAO Code of Conduct on 
Responsible Fisheries, supra note 66. 
87 Barnes, supra note 11, at 155-63. 
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international law, the scope for effective monitoring of and control over public 
responsibilities is quite limited.  
It might be argued that certain environmental commitments possess an erga omnes 
character that grants individual States the right to pursue claims for breaches of collective 
interests.
88
 However, although such a right exists in principle, it is not clear how effective it 
will be in practice, since such a right is contingent on the underlying collective interest being 
sufficiently well defined and worth pursuing as a legal claim. By way of illustration, we can 
look at experiences in respect of (not) holding States to account for their failure to properly 
conserve and manage the living resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Arguably 
the EEZ represents a form of stewardship, whereby the claim to enjoy exclusive resource 





Law as a system requires specific rules and decisions to be made in accordance with pre-
existing or higher order principles. This requirement of coherence helps ensure consistency in 
the application of the law and allows for legal agents to plan and carry out their activities. 
Principles make the law intelligible and ascertainable. This alone provides good reason for 
trying to identify governance principles for ABNJ. Such principles must be in accordance 
with the fundamental values of the community. They must also be aligned with the nature of 
the regulatory subject matter. Although Oude Elferink adopts a largely inductive approach, 
drawing his principles from the existing body of rules on the law of the sea, the eventual list 
of principles largely meets these more fundamental demands. It is important to stress the 
directive and coordinating function of principles, and to emphasise that this is an inherent 
quality of principles that is not contingent on their particular manifestation in a binding or 
non-binding instrument.  
Most of the listed principles relate to legal process rather than matters of substance. 
There is nothing wrong with such a focus, but one should appreciate that this also demands 
strong institutional mechanisms that support procedural demands.
89
 It is not at all clear 
whether existing mechanisms are fully capable of delivering this at the present time, given 
the decentralised nature of international law and the absence of cross-sectoral management 
regimes capable of putting principles into practice. Nor, as Oude Elferink points out, does 
there appear to be much appetite for a global organisation for governing all of the above.
 90
  
So we are left with what might be termed „soft‟ institutional support through the UN General 
Assembly and Meetings of States Parties.  
Although some principles allude to substantive goals, they tend to focus on 
requirements of general environmental protection rather than difficult issues of resource 
allocation. This approach is understandable, first given the focus of governance on decision-
making, but also the difficulty of reconciling what appear to be fundamental differences 
between States concerning the legal status of certain resources and the potential distribution 
of benefits derived from ABNJ. One might consider whether there is any need to try and 
structure the principles, or identify a hierarchy. However, this would miss the point about 
their inherent coordinating function. As soon as one looks at the principles in any detail, it 
becomes immediately clear that they do not and should not operate in isolation. This points to 
                                                   
88 See Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility 2001.  The draft Articles are available online at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. 
89 See Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section on Content and Format of a Document on Governance Principles for 
ABNJ. 
90 Ibid.  
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a fundamental role for integration in decision-making. Integration requires not just the use of 
principles in combination, it requires a cross-sectoral approach to regulation, capable of 
accommodating complex interactions between and cumulative impacts of activities. It also 
means that ABNJ cannot be governed in isolation from other ocean spaces. Finally, 
governance must not be seen as limited to the domain of law or politics. Although principles 
encompassing science-based decision-making and precautionary and ecosystem approaches 
are relatively new, they have quickly become central features of marine management regimes 
and as such should be recognised in the basic list of governance principles.  
 1 
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This paper comments upon the list of governance principles for areas beyond national 
jurisdiction (ABNJ) advanced by the report of Alex Oude Elferink. It begins by considering 
the meaning of governance principles, and how they can contribute to the development of the 
legal regime for ABNJ. It suggests that such principles need to be rooted in more than 
existing rules, although such rules provide an important means of inducing the existence of 
general principles. Governance principles need to be properly aligned with the nature of the 
spaces and resources found in ABNJ, as well as fundamental values of the international 
community and contours of legal authority. The paper offers some further comments on the 
specific principles, emphasising the importance of not just strong procedural approaches but 
also principles that facilitate a sound and reliable knowledge basis for decision-making and 
that advance a strong version of integrated management. 
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The question of how best to regulate areas and activities located beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction is one of paramount concern to international lawyers. Apart from the practical 
need for rules to ensure that activities are conducted in a conflict-free, safe and 
environmentally sensitive manner, the issue is also of concern because of the particular 
political and intellectual challenges it provokes. What rules should be adopted, how, and by 
whom, and, more fundamentally, what values should such rules advance? Areas beyond the 
limits of (exclusive) national jurisdiction (ABNJ) are necessarily subject to collective 
regulation. This means that any regulation ought to be inclusive of the interests of all States 
and, potentially, the international community as a whole. Here the distinction is between the 
disaggregated views of States and the aggregate views of the international community. This 
presents myriad problems, not least in distinguishing between such views, but in finding the 
means, institutional or otherwise, to capture these values.  
The purpose of this paper is to reflect upon some aspects of this complex set of issues 
in light of Alex Oude Elferink’s report on the design and operation of governance principles 
for ABNJ. That report sets out and comments upon a list of eleven principles and four 
potential principles that could be used to direct the more specific regulation of ABNJ. 
Fortunately, there is considerable merit in his review of the issues, so one is afforded the 
luxury of adding a gloss to his efforts, although it is hoped that some of the comments will 
also provoke further debate about the content and role of these principles. In the second part 
of this paper, some reflections are provided concerning the ‘legal’ nature of oceans 
governance principles, first in terms of their broader legitimacy, and then second in terms of 
how they fit within existing structures of international law. In the third part of this paper, I 
consider the key principles in turn, exploring where there may be room for strengthening the 
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authority of each principle and noting any potential problems, whether practical or 
conceptual, with the scope of each principle. 
 
 
The Meaning and Legitimacy of Governance Principles 
 
For Oude Elferink, there are two reasons reason for formulating the list. The first is to 
provide unequivocal reconfirmation that these principles have to be applied to ABNJ. The 
second is to provide a sound basis for developing a coherent regime for the governance of 
ABNJ.
1
 In adopting this position, Oude Elferink regards the list to be somewhat declaratory, 
a restatement of principles that already exist and apply to ABNJ. The process is inductive and 
so Oude Elferink takes time to provide evidence in support of each principle. Although this 
may be sufficient, it is useful to dig a little deeper into the question of the role of such 
principles, since it is useful to have some external measure of the principles’ legitimacy other 
than their purely instrumental function. Also, an inductive approach perhaps constrains future 
opportunities by focusing on what exists at present and may be regarded as self-limiting.
2
 We 
have the opportunity to design such principles with an eye on a developing a better regulatory 
regime. In an earlier exploration of the principles and objective of oceans governance, Treves 
was keen to point out that governance does not always coincide with the concept used by 
lawyers, it includes the idea of ‘good government, government for the general interest of 
those governed, on the basis of commonly shared values and with the involvement of 
stakeholders’.
3
 This rightly alludes to the broader legitimacy that any system or governance 
regime must possess if it is to succeed. Oude Elferink’s principles may well possess 
legitimacy in narrow legal terms, but they should also possess a deeper sense of legitimacy.
4
 
Taking our lead from Treves, one means of evaluating Oude Elferink’s principles is to 
ask whether or not they confirm to broader ideas of good governance. Notions of governance 
abound in the wider academic literature.
5
 It is a rather mutable concept, but it is generally 
understood to be concerned with direction, delivery, facilitation and information provision in 
the context of a decision-making process. Thus Krasner talks of ‘sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations’.
6
 Of course, it is not simply governance to 
which we aspire, but a particular quality of good governance. This is of course much more 
difficult to articulate and reach agreement upon. Accounts of good governance generally 
include: participation of stakeholders, accountability of decision-makers, the existence of 
                                                   
1   A.G. Oude Elferink, Governance Principles for Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, Report on research 
question 2 of the Study on ‘Biological Diversity and Governance of the High Seas’ (commissioned by 
Netherlands Ministry of Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation) (2011). A revised version of the report is included 
as one of the contributions to this Special issue.  Introduction. 
2 See A. D’Amato, ‘International Law as an Autopoietic System’ in R. Wolfrum and V. Rӧben (eds.) 
Developments of International Law in Treaty Making (Springer, Berlin, 2005), 335. 
3 T. Treves, ‘Principles and Objectives of the Legal Regime Governing Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ in 
A.G. Oude Elferink and E.J. Molenaar (eds.), The International Regime of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: 
Current and Future Developments (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010), 7-25, at 7. 
4 On the legitimacy of law generally, see further, J. Brunée and S. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).  
5 For a useful perspective see S.J. Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law’ in M. Byers 
(ed.), The Role of International Law in Politics. Essays in International Relations and International Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), 91. Also, P. Sands, ‘International Law in the Field of Sustainable 
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6 S. Krasner, Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’ in S. Krasner (ed.) 
International Regimes (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983), 2. 
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institutions capable of supporting decision-making, procedural or substantive integration in 
the regulation of subject matter, and some degree of certainty so as to provide a basis for 
forming expectations about future behaviour.
7
 Good governance also includes adaptability, 
because social and real world conditions are not fixed in stone, and so decision-making must 
be capable of accommodating new eventualities. Such attributes permeate Oude Elferink’s 
principles, especially respect for the law of the sea, international cooperation, the integrated 
approach, public availability of information, and transparent and open decision-making. 
Indeed, there is nothing in this list that visibly challenges our ideas of good governance. The 
real challenges will come when trying to put these principles it practice. 
It may be noted that governance as outlined above is overtly about how to make 
decisions. It is a means to an end, rather than the end itself. This suggests an overtly 
procedural approach. This is not necessarily problematic, as long as sufficient procedures or 
institutions exist to support decision-making. This may be more problematic, for at present 
decision-making in respect of ABNJ remains highly decentralised and rather fragmented. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the principles should also be concerned with the substantive 
goals of the international community, such as resource allocation and environmental 
protection.
8
 Some of Oude Elferink’s principles touch upon substantive matters, such as the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, sustainable and equitable use, and 
stewardship. However, these are couched rather general terms and Oude Elferink takes some 
care to avoid being drawn into any consideration of resource distribution. For example, he 
suggests that the principle of sustainable use should accommodate the views of both groups 
of States, supporting either free access or the application of common heritage to marine 
genetic resources in ABNJ.
9
 Further reliance is placed upon the highly contextual notion of 
equitable use, thereby avoiding making any generalisations about who gets what and when. 
That said, even Rawls shied away from an overtly redistributive approach, preferring to leave 
such uncertain matters to ongoing dialogue and process.
10
 Here is not the place to engage in a 
sustained critique of procedural fairness in international law. However, one can observe that 
since the formal equality of States has limited influence on actual decision-making even 
formal procedural guarantees may not result in equitable outcomes. Unless the institutions of 
governance can properly structure and facilitate the interactions of all States, then adopting a 
limited or minimalist procedural approach exposes one to the criticism that one is simply 
reinforcing structural inequalities between States.  
Another approach is to ask whether or not application of governance principles is 
properly aligned with the regulatory subject matter. The value of this approach is that such an 
alignment can reinforce not only the procedural principles, but also the substantive principles, 
since they are concerned with a broader range of values. Arguably, there are three measures 
of ‘fit’ that can be used to test the suitability of governance principles: Physical fit, legal fit 
and moral fit. In addition, we might consider political fit and intellectual fit.  
The first test of fit is to ask whether or not the principles of governance are properly 
aligned with the physical nature of the subject matter to which they apply. If law is to be 
meaningful it must not ignore the natural limits of the subject matter. Thus we do not 
legislate for bottled sunlight or treat finite resources as renewable. What then are the physical 
attributes of ABNJ that determine the fit of governance principles? Some of the general 
attributes of ocean spaces in ABNJ have been known for centuries. Thus the boundless and 
                                                   
7 See for example the principles listed in European Commission, White Paper on European Governance 
(WPEG), COM(2001) 428 final [2001] OJ C287/1.  Also, C. Harlowe, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest 
for Principles and Values’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 187. 
8 T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), 7-9. 
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inexhaustible qualities of the oceans sustained the Grotian principles of freedom of the high 
seas for centuries.
11
 However, there is now better awareness of the complex relations within 
and between ecosystems which may demand more nuanced regulatory approaches that can 
account for such interactions. Ocean waters remains physically unbound and fluid, capable of 
interactions with water bodies within and beyond national jurisdiction. The quality of water 
bodies is sustained and replenished through complex global processes. This means that water 
bodies in ABNJ should not be governed in isolation from other marine or natural 
environments. Thus the principles must embrace cooperative action and not merely as a 
matter of process. It may indeed, demand a more general application of an approach akin to 
the compatibility requirement under Article 7 of the Fish Stocks Agreement.
12
 The open seas 
also defy physical boundaries that can generally exclude persons from access to it. They are a 
common pool natural resource, and so are difficult and costly to regulate.
13
 The seas sustain 
multiple uses, ranging from navigation to resource provision. This demands integrated and 
inclusive decision-making. The physical nature of the oceans places a high degree of inter-
relationship between the oceans and the creatures living therein. Such resources, for example 
fish, are fungible, moveable and unascertained, meaning that they cannot readily be reduced 
to exclusive control. Marine living resources may be renewable, but we know that there are 
thresholds for exploitation, which if crossed will cause the degradation, collapse, and 
potential extinction of a resource. Marine ABNJ also comprise the sea-bed and its mineral 
resources, and, arguably, living resources around deep sea hydrothermal vent sites. The 
mineral resources are finite and exhaustible and so regulatory principles might be designed to 
direct users towards the most sustainable use patterns.
14
 Other resources in ABNJ, such as 
biodiversity, are inherently indivisible, shared goods. This may demand different kinds of 
regulatory principles. Here it is important to distinguish biodiversity from the components of 
biodiversity, such as individual species of fish. The latter are the potentially subject to 
appropriation and may be subject to acquisition or individual control. In contrast biodiversity 
is a non-exclusive attribute that transcends the individual component of biodiversity. All 
persons have an interest in biodiversity, but individuals cannot regulate it in isolation. Thus 
biodiversity ‘goods’ in ABNJ demand positive obligations to cooperate, gather and share 




It should be apparent that the physical nature of marine ABNJ and the resources 
therein reinforce the need for cooperative and integrated regulation. Yet they also require 
principles that can adapt to their physical exigencies. This strongly reinforces the importance 
of Oude Elferink’s principles that encompass the ecosystem approach, the precautionary 
approach, integrated approach, and the use of science based management. If regulation is 
aligned with the nature of a resource, then it must be based upon sound knowledge and good 
science. 
 The second test of governance principles is that of legal fit. Subject to the foregoing 
remarks about the physical alignment of regulatory principles, governance principles ought to 
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be sensitive to limits inherent in current legal processes, such as the allocations of authority 
and the limits imposed by law as a concept. For example, principles should not require States 
to act ultra vires. It is notable that Oude Elferink mostly limits his discussion of the principles 
to ABNJ, treating it is a discrete legal space. Of course, matters are not so simple. Oude 
Elferink is, of course, sensitive to the broader political context within which the regime of 
ABNJ is developing. As Treves has observed, the ‘high seas only’ approach is the product of 
ideology and history, and ensures that the hard fought extension of State sovereignty over sea 
areas is not threatened by recursions from institutions operating in ABNJ.
16
 However 
persuasive arguments for the application of governance mechanisms that transcend such 
boundaries, political will and legal boundaries seem to dictate otherwise. Of course, it must 
be observed that the limits of legal authority are not always well aligned to regulation of 
marine spaces, hence the difficulties in regulating straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 
Indeed, one could argue that any legal authority drawn without any regard to the nature of a 
thing is doomed to fail. We have all heard of the story of King Canute and his attempt to 
command the tides. In the present author’s opinion, this strong regard for legal boundaries 
produces a degree of conflict within the logic of the principles. For example, Oude Elferink 
places much emphasis on the principle of integration, focusing on integration between 
different sectors, such as fisheries and pollution control, but at the same time limits this 
principle spatially to ABNJ.
17
 Given the overlapping nature of the subject matter and the 
potential for transboundary interactions, it seems incongruous to ignore that integration 
should also operate spatially back into areas within national jurisdiction (AWNJ) and this 
should form an explicit part of this principle.
18
 At the very least it should provoke efforts to 
overcome the potential obstacles presented by capriciously drawn boundaries of legal 
authority. 
Another aspect of legal fit is the requirement that individual legal rules ought to form 
part of a coherent system of rules. This requires similar factual situations to be addressed by 
similar rules. For example, unless a rational distinction can be drawn between pollution of 
coastal waters and pollution in ABNJ, then a similar rules concerning liability for harm 
should apply to each instance of pollution. The requirement for coherence means that legal 
principles applicable to ABNJ ought to be coherent with principles for the law of the sea or 
international law in general. 
 Next is the question of the alignment of governance principles with fundamental 
moral values. If governance principles are aligned with fundamentally held values then they 
will have a higher degree of legitimacy. All legal institutions are underpinned by a broader 
set of values, and it is useful to understand what these are and how they influence the 
institution. For example, it is widely acknowledged that property is justified accordingly a 
plurality of social values.
19
 Natural rights theory in the Lockean tradition demands that 
socially productive work is rewarded. In the liberal tradition, a high value is placed on 
governance mechanisms that protect the material and political agency of individuals. Under 
utilitarian theory decisions are designed to maximise general welfare. Transcending these 
approaches there is the idea that property rules should facilitate social order, be consistent 
and certain so that future action may be planned. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to 
consider this further, but there is clearly a role to play for such values in testing the principles 
of governance for ABNJ. Such values might not be universal values, but they are certainly 
powerful, especially within Western legal traditions. The point is not to espouse a particular 
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set of values, but rather to indicate that values should play a role in the design of legal 
institutions, including governance principles for ABNJ. 
 Two additional measures of the legitimacy of the principles are suggested. First, 
governance principles should be sensitive to questions of political authority. In its most 
simple form, this means that the principles must be something that can be realised in practice. 
This suggests a degree of pragmatism, and this may run counter to the previous call for 
‘morally fitting’ governance principles. However, there is clearly no point in designing a 
principle for which there is no political will. Thus, there seems little point in calling for the 
creation of a new supra-national agency that will manage ABNJ, at least for present. It is 
notable that Oude Elferink was quite careful to draft the first principle in terms that guarded 
against a singular legal characterisation of ABNJ, given the well-known differences of 
opinion on the status of marine genetic resources. On the other hand, he more than dips his 
toe in the waters of institutional reform by considering quite seriously the idea of ocean 
stewardship. Political power is more often manifest in more subtle ways, and it is important 
to be sensitive to this also. For example, any government agency or department possesses a 
degree of independent personality and generates a degree of functional self-value. In practice 
such agencies may jealously guard existing authority and seek to acquire more. This may 
make it difficult to secure agreement between different constituencies when there is the risk 
of a loss of authority. ‘Political fit’ understood in these senses might not be the best driver of 
governance, but it does caution against being dangerously idealistic. 
 Finally, there is the question of intellectual fit. Developments in governance do not 
occur in an intellectual vacuum. The information, ideas and values that inform public debate 
and decision-making are readily drawn from various intellectual disciplines science, politics, 
economic, law and so on. In the past there has been a tendency for debate to stay within the 
secure realms of discrete epistemic communities. However, such divides are breaking down 
and there are demands for far greater integration and collaboration between different 
disciplines.
20
 It is suggested that this intellectual climate demands principles that embody 
integration between natural and social sciences, and that each has an important role to play in 
defining the scope and content of the principles.
21
 This is manifest in part in the Oude 
Elferink’s call for principles embodying science-based decision-making, the precautionary 
approach and the ecosystem approach.  
 
 
The Legal Status of the Principles of Oceans Governance 
 
It was noted above that principles ought to fit within existing legal structures. A further 
aspect of this looks at how the enumerated principles fit within or relate to the formal sources 
of international law. It is not immediately obvious where governance principles might lie. 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to: 
 
‘a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;’ 
 
If we read further into the exposition of the principles by Oude Elferink, we clearly see a 
deliberative effort to locate them within existing rules of treaty law, and in particular, the 
                                                   
20 See for example, the collection of essays from the IFLOS symposia reproduced in (2009) 24(2) IJMCL. 
21 This interdisciplinarity is a feature of resilience-based approaches.  See C. Folke ‘Resilience: The emergence 
of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses’ 2006) 16(3) Global Environmental Change 253-67. 
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. To this extent, the principles might merely 
be regarded as a reiteration of various rules of treaty law. I think, however, that this is not 
enough. If this was the case, then this simply repeats the existence of existing obligations 
under international law. They are binding on States party to the relevant agreement, and may 
have wider effect if they meet the requirements of Article 34-38 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, and produce legal effects for third States, or form part of customary 
international law. The principles might constitute rules of customary international law of a 
rather general nature. Locating such principles in custom has the immediate advantage of 
establishing general rules that are binding on all States, and this seems to be of fundamental 
importance in the development of a legal regime for the regulation of a global commons that 
all States are entitled to access and utilise. Of course, this would require Oude Elferink to 
demonstrate that each and every principle manifests the requirements of customary 
international law. This may be the case for many manifestations of each principle, but I do 
not propose to categorically review that status of each principle in terms of its customary 
status.
22
 This is not to deny that some of the principles discussed are in fact rules of 
customary international law, or that particular manifestations of the principles are part of 
customary international law. However, the important point here is that the principles are 
principles, and not merely rules. Reading the report as a whole, it is clear that Oude Elferink 
wants to do something more, or perhaps less, than list existing rules or treaty law or custom. 
The principles are not intended to simply reconstitute strictly binding rules of law for 
application to ABNJ, and so the principles might be viewed as poor relation to binding laws. 
But, on the other hand, they would appear to possess a more nuanced directive quality 
capable of shaping a range of more precise rules, and so are more than mere rules. There is an 
important distinction between rules and principles, and this needs to be kept in mind when 
evaluating the function of the principles. 
 
A rule [...] is essentially practical and, moreover, binding; there are rules of art as 
there are rules of government, while a principle expresses a general truth, which 
guides our action, serves as a theoretical basis for the various acts of our life, and the 




I shall return to this distinction in more detail below, but first it is useful to comment on the 
third source of international law: the category of general principles.  
 The precise nature and function of general principles of law is a much debated topic.
24
 
This is despite the fact that general principles find a place in most legal systems. One view is 
that such principles are rules accepted in the municipal law of all ‘civilised’ States. A more 
nuanced view is that they authorise the Court to apply ‘principles of municipal jurisprudence, 
insofar as they are applicable to the relations of States.’
25
 Resort to such principles was a 
more common feature of international adjudication in the nineteenth century. This reflected 
the fact that international law was a less complete system and recourse to such principles was 
necessary in order to prevent a non liquet. It is notable that in the twentieth century, the ICJ 
has had little occasion to refer to general principles to resolve the disputes before it. This is 
                                                   
22 Various principles have been considered in more detail by other writers.  See for example, A. Trouwborst, 
Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2002). 
23 Gentini case (1903).  Cited in B. Cheng, General Principles of International Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, 1953), 24. 
24 See further, B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Grotius, 
1987). 
25 R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.) Oppenheim’s International Law 9th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford,  
2008), vol. I, 37. 
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because rules of custom and treaty generally provide a sufficient basis for a decision. It may 
also be because the ICJ is conservative in its application of rules derived from positive law, 
so as not to threaten its consent based jurisdiction.
26
 Discreet from general principles 
narrowly construed, Brownlie also lists as a source ‘general principles of international law’.
27
 
Such appears to include rules of custom and logical propositions resulting from judicial 
reasoning. However, they have a distinct identity: 
 
‘In many cases these principles are to be traced to state practice. However, they are 
primarily abstractions from the mass of rules and have been so long and so generally 




 It is notable that the leading text on the law of the sea acknowledges a minor role for 
the category. The authors take the view that the ‘rather vague category of ‘general principles 
of international law’ is not of great significance for the law of the sea’.
29
 They go on to note 
that certain principles are of profound importance to the law of the sea, such as freedom of 
the high seas. However, they suggest that these are better categorised as principles of custom. 
These are distinct from commonly accepted general principles, such as estoppel or audi 
alteram partem, which have strongly influenced the procedural administration of 
international law. The treatment of principles in this way reaffirms Brownlie’s view that the 
sources of international law cannot be rigidly classified.  
 A useful, threefold classification of legal principles is provided by de Sadeleer.
30
 
First, he lists the general summaries of the law as presented by academic scholars. Second, 
there are general principles of legal logic, such as the lex specialis derogat legi generali rule, 
which are better regarded as interpretative tools. Finally, there are general principles that 
have been created by courts to provide greater coherence to the legal system and fill gaps or 
remove obscurity within the legal system. It is this third category that provides the more 
useful starting point for our analysis. Principles in this third sense provide a crucial role by 
providing coherence to a legal system. They provide a means of ordering more specific legal 
rules, and of ensuring a degree of consistency within legal systems. For example, a general 
principle may be the polluter pays principle. Within the umbrella of the general principle, 
there may be numerous specific rules, dictating for example that a ship-owner is strictly liable 
for damages caused by the release of oil resulting from a collision, or a that a fishermen is 
responsible for using fishing gear that causes damage to habitats. The individual rules share a 
familiar resemblance and may be subject to shared constraints and modes of operation. New 
rules, or the application of existing rules to new situations, may be evaluated according to the 
extent they fall within the general principle, or share common traits with analogous rules. A 
court faced with the application of a rule may refer to the general principle underlying the 
rule to help determine its proper meaning.  
 A general principle is induced from a mass of specific rules. This approach is 
followed by Oude Elferink. Of course care must be taken here if we are to accept principles 
of law induced from State practice, then there is always the risk that the principle is advanced 
without due attention to the body of law that supports it. It would hardly be permissible to 
assert a general principle that was derived from a custom that in itself was not clearly 
                                                   
26 W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens and Sons, London, 1964), 189. 
27 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 6 th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), 18-9. 
28 Ibid., 19. 
29 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 3rded (Mancherster University Press, Manchester, 1999), 
12. 
30 N. De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles. From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002), 236. 
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evidenced by sufficient State practice. A cautionary tale here is the treatment of sustainable 
development by the ICJ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case.
31
 The Court referred to the 
‘concept’ of sustainable development, not the principle, without further relying upon it as the 
basis for its judgment. Although Weeramantry strongly advocated the existence a customary 
principle in his Dissenting Opinion,
32
 Lowe has more convincingly argued that the concept 
lacks a fundamentally norm creating character.
33
 In this sense it is better regarded as part of a 
framework within which decisions can be made. Of course this is not critical to the exercise 
of advancing a list of principles of oceans governance, but it does caution against an 
unsophisticated view of their normative relevance.  
 It is interesting to note that Oude Elferink refrains from adopting a formal definition 
of the term ‘governance principle’. He is clearly sensitive to the complexities and 
complications that follow from any such definition. Instead he settles for a working definition 
that conceives of governance principles as guiding States and other actors in adopting and 
implementing specific rules or approaches in respect of activities in ABNJ.
34
 The only 
threshold used to calibrate such principles is the quality of bindingness. Of course, this in 
itself is somewhat mutable.  
 
Some Observations on the Governance Principles 
 
As Oude Elferink notes, there is little need to formulate a list of principles of oceans 
governance from scratch. One or other of the principles and, quite often, most of the 
principles have been iterated elsewhere.
35
 Such principles are not merely the views of 
academics, but are also being advanced by States, and this is surely the most important test of 
their normative relevance.  
 
Respect for the Law of the Sea, in Particular the LOSC and Related Instruments 
 
At first glance, this call for respect for the law of the sea suggests something analogous to the 
rule of law, as applied to ABNJ. This would seem a strong first choice for a governance 
principle. However, Oude Elferink seems to struggle to pin this principle down, and 
ultimately suggests that it might be phrased thus: ‘The international law of the sea establishes 
a comprehensive legal order for areas beyond national jurisdiction’. There is nothing wrong 
with this statement, evincing a general truth about the law of the sea. It does, however, seem 
to lack the normative force one might expect of a principle, and one wonders whether it 
might be better restated ‘States shall respect the comprehensive order for the law of the sea 
that applies to areas beyond national jurisdiction’. A further point, which is not raised by 
Oude Elferink in his principle, is the issue of compliance, particularly through the mechanism 
of flag State jurisdiction. Most activities in ABNJ are carried out by private persons, who are 
subject to the control of flag States. Unfortunately, the mechanism of flag State control is 
imperfect, either because of the practical problems of securing compliance, or the lack of 
political will by certain flag States to properly control the activities of vessels flying their 
                                                   
31 (1997) ICJ Rep. 7. 
32 At 92 and following , especially at 104. 
33 A.V. Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.) 
International Law and Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford, 
University Press, Oxford, 1999), 19 and 25. 
34 Oude Elferink, supra note 1 at 00. 
35 See for example, D. Freestone, ‘Modern Principles of High Seas Governance - The Legal Underpinnings’ 
(2009) 39 Environmental Policy and Law 44-9.  
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flag. This is a significant and generally understood governance gap, and one that would 
usefully be filled by an explicit governance principle. 
Closer reading of the commentary suggests a more nuanced content, since Oude 
Elferink combines a potential number of principles under this first heading. He begins by 
discussing the conditional freedom of the high seas, as contained in Article 87 of the LOSC. 
This much seems uncontroversial as it applies to the high seas, especially the strong emphasis 
on the conditionality of this principle. What is interesting to note is that freedom of the high 
seas imports substantive values into the governance principles since it implies a substantive 
right of access to certain marine spaces and resource. It is not merely about decision-making 
unless it is read as a right not to be excluded from participation in a regime in general. This 
careful handling of the freedom of the high seas is unsurprising, not least because it may 
generate concerns when juxtaposed with the common heritage principle that applies to the 
seabed. Given this substantive element to the principle, it is not surprising that much 
emphasis is on its conditionality. There is also force in the argument that the conditional 
freedom is to be treated as a dynamic principle, facilitated by the general rule of reference in 
Article 87. The same point is reiterated for Articles 138 and 235. It may be recalled that the 
law of the sea is part of international law and is subject to the same systemic requirements 
that constrain and shape general international law.
36
 The freedom of the high seas is subject 
to general systemic requirements of international law, such as restrictions on the use of force 
and protection of human rights. There is nothing special about the freedom that excludes such 
fundamental concerns. At this point one can begin to appreciate the importance of the 
principle of integration which makes explicit such complex interactions and the need for 
coherence and consistency in a legal system. 
 Oude Elferink goes on to state that the conditional freedom is to be fulfilled in good 
faith. The principle of good faith is not limited to the application of the freedom of the high 
seas. It is a distinct principle, of general application but contextual meaning.
37
 The 
requirement to act in good faith is one of the most fundamental principles of international 
law.
38
 It has a long history, being reiterated in a range of cases from the North Coast Atlantic 
Fisheries case
39
 to the Shrimp Turtle case.
40
 It also appears in the Article 2(2) of the United 
Nations Charter and the Declaration of Friendly Principles.
41
 The principle is manifest in the 
doctrine of abuse of rights, pacta sunt servanda, and, perhaps, most germane to 
environmental issues, duties of consultation and prior notification,
42
 and management of 
shared or common resources.
43
 Finally, it may be noted that the principle is a qualifying 
requirement, and not a source of obligation itself. States must act in good faith in respect of 
                                                   
36 See further A. Boyle, ‘Further Development of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in Freestone et al. 
(eds), supra note 14, at 40. 
37 See the Case concerning the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO und Egypt 
(1980) ICJ Rep. 96, para. 49. 
38 As the ICJ has observed, good faith is ‘one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of 
legal obligations".  The Nuclear Tests cases (1974) ICJ Reports, 268, para. 46. 
39 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain, United States) 7 Sept 1910. Reproduced in RIAA, 
vol. XXI, 167 at 187-9. 
40 Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, para 158. Reproduced in 
(1999) 38 ILM 118. 
41 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States 
in Accordance with International Law, GA Res 2625/XXV 24 Oct. 1970. 
42 See P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell International Law and the Environment 3rd ed. (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009), 177. 
43 In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ noted how certain general obligations were to be ‘transformed into specific 
obligations of performance through a process of consultation and negotiation. Their implementation thus 





 So in the context of a specific treaty obligation, it ‘obliges the 
Parties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be 
realized’.
45
 This clearly alludes to some quality of process in decision-making – the decision 
must be reasonable. More generally, reasonableness is used to constrain the factors that can 
be used to reach a decision. In public law it seeks to delimit the factors that are relevant in 
reaching a decision.
46
 This approach applies equally to international adjudication and 
decision-making.
47
 More might be said about the meaning and content of good faith, but for 
present purposes it is sufficient to show how it opens up possibilities for calibrating decision-
making and could begin to influence the governance of ABNJ. Given this meaning of the 
principle to act in good faith, one wonders whether it might be restated as a distinct 
governance principle for ABNJ, rather than find itself packaged up with this particular 
principle.  
 
The Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment 
 
The second principle requires States to ‘protect and preserve the marine environment of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction’. It is notable that it appears to be a principle of substance rather 
than process. That it is concerned with the idea of preventing harm to an area of common 
concern rather than the distribution of resources means that it is more readily acceptable. 
Oude Elferink is unequivocally right to assert that there can be no doubt that the general 
obligation of States to protect and preserve the marine environment reflects general 
international law.
48
 It extends to all oceans and parts of the sea, both within and beyond 
national jurisdiction. There is scope to refer to other potential authorities for this principle, 
including Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
49
 and the various regional seas agreements.
50
 One also 
wonders whether the principle could have been couched in terms of due diligence. This 
would require States to ensure that not only their own conduct was in conformity with the 
principle, but also that of any actors or agents over which they have effective control.
51
 This 
seems particularly important in the context of activities in the Areas, which will most likely 
be conducted by private companies.
52
 As noted above ensuring that non-State actor comply 
with the international law of the sea is one of the key governance issues for ABNJ. 
 Some further supporting evidence for the general principle is provided by the rules of 
reference in Articles 207-212 of the LOSC, which link the general obligation to the creation 
of generally accepted international rules and standards. Although Article 215 seems to detach 
the Area from the general requirements of Part XII, the general approach is restated in Article 
145 which requires the adoption of rules to protect the marine environment of the Area. In 
any case the point of a general principle, as outlined above, is to provide a means of directing 
                                                   
44 Border and Transborder Armed Actions case (1988) ICJ Rep. 69, at 105. 
45 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 31, para 142. 
46 See T.R. Hickman, ‘The Reasonableness Principle: Reassessing its Place in the Public Sphere’ (2004) 63 
Cambridge Law Journal 166. 
47 See the Area Advisory Opinion, paras. 229-30. 
48 Oude Elferink, supra note 1, Section The protection and preservation of the marine environment, Discussion. 
49 A/CONF.151/26 (vol. III), 13 August 1992. Reproduced in A.V. Lowe and S.A.G. Talmon, The Legal Order 
of the Oceans (Hart, Oxford, 2009), 459. 
50 See for example, the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
1992, (1993) 23 LOSB 32.  It is notable that OSPAR has been actively engaged in the protection of ABNJ.  See 
the Bergen Statement of the Ministerial Meeting of the OSPAR Commission 23-24 September 2010.  Available 
http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/news/ospar_2010_bergen_statement.pdf 
51 See the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (2010) ICJ Rep. 1, para. 197. 
52 See Article 139(1) of the LOSC.  Also, Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area (2010), para 108.  Available online at 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf 
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the regulation of a subject matter. Thus it guides the development of rules of environmental 
protection of ABNJ in light of rules developed in AWNJ and more generally. It this sense it 
also serves to reinforce the principle of integration. Thus it forms part of a network of related 




The duty to cooperate is not limited to the law of the sea. It is a general principle of 
international law that States cooperate with each other. As such, one can refer to a far greater 
array of instruments and decisions to reaffirm the existence of this principle.
53
 Such 
authorities aside, it is manifest in the simple fact that States regularly cooperate with each 
other. As such there is little doubt that such a principle must apply to ABNJ. What is more 
interesting is to try to ascertain the meaning of the duty. 
 Oude Elferink takes a rather liberal approach to cooperation. Thus States are ‘in the 
best position to establish the exact content of the cooperation that is required of them’.
54
 This 
reflects the need for flexibility in the means of cooperation, but also the fact that the duty 
does not appear to be well-developed under international law beyond a simple obligation of 
process. In this respect, the duty to cooperate is notoriously limited. As the PCIJ noted in the 
Advisory Opinion on Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, ‘the obligation to 
negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement’.
55
 That said there are some 
indications that cooperation is more than a minimal form of engagement between States. In 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stressed that ‘the parties are under an 
obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful.’
56
 More recently, 
ITLOS noted in the Mox Plant case:  
 
the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the 
marine environment under Part XII of the Convention and general international law 
and that rights arise there from which the Tribunal may consider appropriate to 




ITLOS then prescribed provisional measures requiring consultation and exchange of 
information.
58
 In the same case, the importance of cooperation was further stressed by 
Wolfrum in his Separate Opinion: ‘The obligation to cooperate with other States whose 
interests may be affected is a Grundnorm of Part XII of the Convention, as of customary 




[t]he duty to cooperate denotes an important shift in the general orientation of the 
international legal order. It balances the principle of sovereignty of States and thus 
ensures that community interests are taken into account vis-à-vis individualistic State 
interests. It is a matter of prudence and caution as well as in keeping with the 
                                                   
53 See for example, Article 3 of the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN GA Res 3281 
(XXIX) 1974, A/RES/29/3281; UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct on Shared Natural Resources 1978, 
reproduced in (1978) 17 ILM 1097; Convention on the Law of Non-navigations Use of International 
Watercourses 1997, (1997) 36 ILM 719.  
54 Oude Elferink, supra note 1 section International cooperation, Formulation and core content of the principle  
55 (1931) PCIJ Rep. Ser.A/B, No. 42, 108, at 116. 
56 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, (1969) ICJ Rep. 47, para. 85). 
57 Mox Plant case (ITLOS -UK v. Ireland), Request for Provisional Measures, ITLOS reports 2001, 82. 
58 Ibid., para 89. 
59 Available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/sep.op.Wolfrum.E.orig.pdf 
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overriding nature of the obligation to co-operate that the parties should engage therein 




In this sense the duty is not just the means by which States advance their interests; it is the 
means by which community interests emerge and may be protected. This seems particularly 
important in ABNJ, where actions directly concern the international community and not 
merely neighbouring States. In the Land Reclamation case, ITLOS did not accede to 
Malaysia’s request to be furnished with a range of information pertaining to the certain 
projects, and to be allowed to comment thereon. However, it did require the parties to 
establish a group of experts with the authority to study the effects of land reclamation, and to 
propose measures to deal with any adverse consequences.
61
 Such a measure was justified 
according to the overriding importance of a duty to cooperate in respect of the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. In the same case the Tribunal also referred to prompt 




 It might be possible to further specify the modalities of the duty in greater detail. For 
example, by noting the purpose of cooperation, and not simply leaving it ‘in respect of 
ABNJ’. This could be done by explicitly linking it to the other principles. One idea would be 
to make use of the general requirement to inform other States of activities that may impact 
upon ABNJ, whether potentially harmful or not. States should furnish each other with 
information as far as is reasonable, or appropriate since unless such information is made 
available States cannot ascertain whether or not their interests might be engaged and some 
form of cooperation or involvement in an activity required. Article 142 of the LOSC requires 
prior notification and consultation with coastal States, where deposits straddle national 
boundaries, but it would be odd if no such general requirement exists where other interests of 
States might be at stake. In this sense the duty might also extend as far as establishing the 
grounds for meaningful cooperation. A final observation is that the obligation is not limited 
to States, but is one that is systemic. As there are intergovernmental organisations and other 
actors engaged in activities in ABNJ, the duty to cooperate should extend equally to such 
agencies. It operates between international organisations, and between States and 
international organisations.
63
 Even if such are not directly subject to rules of international 
law, the requirement of cooperation is generally extended to such agencies through other 




 The importance of cooperation for the governance of ABNJ is axiomatic, given the 
fact that cooperation is really the only means by which activities can be effectively regulated 
in ABNJ. A failure of States to agree on the means of cooperation would significantly limit 
the development of any more detailed regime and the proper coordination and control of 
activities in ABNJ. The willingness of dispute settlement fora to direct particular forms of 
cooperation, in light of other overarching principles, indicates the value of not just 
governance principles, but of governance mechanisms and institutions.  
 
                                                   
60 Ibid. 
61 Malaysia v. Singapore, Request for Provisional Measures, 5 September 2003, para. 106.  
62 Ibid., para. 98. 
63 See J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), chapter 7. 
64 See Regulation 31(4) and (6) of the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in 
the Area. Available online at http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/PN-en.pdf. Also Regulation 5(3), 
33(6), 34(1) of the Regulations on prospecting and exploration for polymetallic sulphides in the Area. Available 
online at http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/PolymetallicSulphides.pdf.  See also clause 5 of the 
standard mining contracts annexed to each set of regulations. 
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A Science-based Approach to Management 
 
As indicated above, there should be a science based approach to management of activities in 
ABNJ. This much follows from the argument that the principles must be responsive to the 
physical nature of the regulatory subject matter and that science reveals this. Oude Elferink’s 
commentary refers to Articles 119 of the LOSC as well as a general reference to the Fish 
Stocks Agreement, but mainly draws upon Article 201.
65
 Other potential points of reference 
include Article 6.4 of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,
66
 Article 2 of 
OSPAR, Articles 3(5), 20 and 24 of the Helsinki Convention,
67
 and Chapter 17.25 of Agenda 
21. Indeed, research and the sharing of information is a key feature of regional fisheries 
management organisations and instruments concerning the protection of the marine 
environment, as well as institutions such as the Arctic Council and the Antarctic Treaty 
System. It might be stated as an axiom that regulation is knowledge dependent. However, this 
is not to say that a science based approach is the same in each instance. 
It is notable that Oude Elferink’s commentary is silent on the threshold of what 
constitutes an acceptable standard of science for management purposes. This is probably 
because it is a notoriously difficult standard both to establish and demand of all States. It is 
also problematic for the ultimate bearers of the duty to provide the evidence basis for 
decisions - that is to say the individual scientists and research institutes engaged in marine 
scientific research. In the present writer’s opinion there is a strong sense that legal 
requirements for the provision of the science that provides the evidence base for management 
is insufficiently clear. This is notoriously the case in respect of the EU Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive and the focus in measuring complex environmental conditions, 
designing mechanisms capable of monitoring human impacts on the environment and the 
consequences of regulatory responses to such activities.
68
 There is also a wider concern about 
how such science can be defended against critical scrutiny. This stems directly from the fact 
that science does not provide absolute truths. It comprises propositions accepted as valid until 
disputed or proven to be incorrect. The commentary refers to appropriate science, and 
indicates that this suggest that the science must meet a certain standard. This is certainly 
desirable since there is no point on relying upon bad, poor or incomplete science. However, I 
am not sure this is the only, or the intended meaning of appropriate. It may also be read as a 
qualifier, and one wonders whether this might actually allow States more leeway to use less 
rigorous quality of science where they deem it appropriate, for example, on the basis of a cost 
benefit analysis.  
 Although the role of science is desirable, or rather fundamental to oceans governance, 
a strict reading of the LOSC shows it only to possess a rather facultative role. The LOSC 
requires standards to be established in light of information gathered under Article 200, but it 
does not require States to go beyond the requirements of Article 200. It merely allows them 
to do so. This is a less than stringent demand for recourse to a particular standard of science. 
As I indicated earlier, the fact that principles should be sensitive to the physical qualities of 
the regulatory subject matter reinforces the central role of science in the management of 
ABNJ. Given the contingent nature of science, this principle needs to be dynamically 
structured. The state of knowledge about the environment or of science generally influences 
the construction of other principles such as the responsibility to protect the environment. 
Thus ITLOS notes that the content of a due diligence obligation ‘may change over time as 
                                                   
65 Oude Elferink, supra section, A Science-based Approach To Management . 
66 Available online at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM. 
67 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 1992, 2099 UNTS 197 
68 See T. Markus, S. Schlacke and N. Maier, ‘Legal Implementation of Integrated Ocean Policies: The EU’s 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive’ (2011) 26 IJMCL 59. 
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measures considered sufficiently diligent at a certain moment may become not diligent 
enough in light, for instance, of new scientific or technological knowledge’.
69
 States should 
take a progressive and ongoing approach to the development and improvement of science, 
and adapt their conduct accordingly. 
As a final word on the principle of science based management, Oude Elferink’s 
explanatory note refers initially to the protection of the environment. It then goes on to 
provide that a ‘science-based approach to the management of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction’ It should be reiterated that such management applies to all activities such as 
fishing and mining activities in ABNJ, and not merely those that may have an adverse impact 
on the marine environment per se. 
 
The Precautionary Approach 
 
Oude Elferink’s fifth principle provides that ‘States shall apply the precautionary approach in 
ABNJ’.
70
 The principle is reaffirmed not merely by the existence of specific rules on the use 
of precaution under general international law, but is also a product of the limited knowledge 
we have about the state of the environment and its resources in ABNJ, and that we must 
accommodate such uncertainty into the management process. As such it is strongly linked to 
the previous principle.  
Oude Elferink induces the principle from a range of obligations and treaty provisions 
under international law, as well as domestic law, and little can be usefully added to this. In 
any case, the issue is not so much the existence of the principle/approach, but the way in 
which it is implemented. International law proscribes a general requirement for its use, but 
does not specify its particular modalities in any given context. This is because its operation is 
highly contingent. That said, its operation clearly relates to other defined conditions, such as 
the use of particular standards of scientific evidence in decision-making. A contextual 
approach poses few difficulties when the principle/approach is applied to AWNJ. There is 
clearly scope for variations in its application depending upon capacity of the State and its 
administrative agencies, availability of resources, and the extent of any knowledge basis in 
respect of the activity, as well as the scale and potential impact of the activity. However, in 
ABNJ, the fact that the spaces and resources are common, with multiple actors engaged in 
similar activities, suggests that highly localised practices might be unsuitable. This suggests 
that States could adopt a more consistent approach to its application. It would seem odd that 
different manifestations of the precautionary principle could arise in respect of similar 
activities in ABNJ. This would open the door for differential standards of conduct. Indeed, 





The Ecosystem Approach 
 
As with the precautionary principle, the ecosystem approach is closely related to the 
requirement for science-based management.
72
 There is little doubt that it is a key feature of 
contemporary marine environmental management regimes, and required by a number of 
                                                   
69 Area Advisory Opinion, supra note 52, para 117. 
70 Oude Elferink, supra section The Precautionary Approach. 
71 K.M. Gjerde et al, Regulatory and Governance Gaps in the International Regime for the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (IUCN, Gland, Switzerland, 
2008).  
72 See S.M. Garcia, ‘Governance, Science and Society: The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries’ in R Quentin 
Grafton et al (eds) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), 76. 
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binding and non-binding instruments.
73
 My key observation on this principle echoes the 
above comments on integration, and relates to its apparently narrow application to ABNJ.
74
 
By definition the approach runs counter to a strict respect for formal legal boundaries and 
requires approaches that address the system as a whole. This does not permit States to act 
beyond their authority, but rather requires cooperation in order to ensure that management fits 
the nature of the issue rather than the formal allocation of competence.  
 
The Integrated Approach 
 
There is little doubt that oceans must be governed in an integrated manner. Habitats 
protection requires consideration of the impacts of shipping and fishing activities, pollution 
control requires certain standards to be applied to the construction and operation of ships and 
offshore mining installations, and so on. Only through such an approach can we assess and 
address the cumulative impacts of human activities in ABNJ. An integrated approach is 
particularly evident under recently developed national marine regulatory regimes and is a 
growing trend in maritime regulation.
75
 Oude Elferink is correct to note that whilst the LOSC 
aspires to an integrated approach in its preamble, the fact is that the bulk of its rules and 
principles retain a highly sectoral focus. At best, the LOSC tends to indirectly or partially 
accommodate an integrated approach. This tends to arise when multiple activities occur 
within the same spatial area.
76
 In his commentary, Oude Elferink refers mainly to pollution 
and the idea of integrated pollution control. This has been relatively well developed under 
environmental law more generally, so the focus is understandable.
77
 This might seem to 
downplay the importance of spatial integration between ABNJ and AWNJ. In this respect one 
should note the more explicit reference to spatially integrated approaches in Article 195 of 
the LOSC, which provides that: 
 
[in] taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution, States shall act so as not 
to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or 
transform one type of pollution into another. 
 
One might also refer to Article 7 of the Fish Stock Agreement, which requires that 
‘[c]onservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for 
areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible’. Further, Article 142 of the LOSC 
requires that: 
 
[a]ctivities in the Area, with respect to resource deposits in the Area which lie across 
limits of national jurisdiction, shall be conducted with due regard to the rights and 
legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose jurisdiction such deposits.’ 
 
                                                   
73 See for example, Article 6 of the FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 66. 
74 Infra at 00. 
75 See for example, the English and Welsh Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, c. 23.  Available 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/23/contents.  Also the EU plan for an integrated maritime policy  - 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 10 October 2007 on an Integrated Maritime Policy for 
the European Union, COM (2007) 575. OJ L 321/1, 5/12/2011. 
76 See for example, the relationship between resource activities and shipping implicit in Article 56(2), 59, and 
60(7), and the notion of due regard in respect of the exercise of high seas freedoms under Article 87(2). 
77 The approach is quite well developed well developed under EU law.  See B. Lange, Implementing EU 
Pollution Control: Law and Integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008).   
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Spaces within and beyond national jurisdiction do not exist in isolation from the wider 
environment and resource systems. The idea of integrated management across this boundary 
is not disregarded by Oude Elferink, but neither is it explicitly mentioned at this point.  
Rather it is left to a general caveat in the section on the relationship between areas within 
national jurisdiction and ABNJ.  This approach seems to puts a higher degree of weight on 
political factors rather than natural factors in the design of governance mechanisms. It might 
also results in a rather one-directional process whereby strong interests of coastal States are 
used to influence the management of ABNJ, but interests emerging in respect of ABNJ are 
not influencing domestic management regimes. To ensure that integration is ‘full’ integration, 
it is suggested that spatial integration be a key requirement of this principle. At the very least, 
there seems to be merit in articulating this principle of integration in such a way that it ‘opens 
the door’ to a wider potential application. Thus the principle might be restated: ‘States shall, 
as appropriate, apply compatible approaches to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment and sustainable use of resources within and beyond areas of national 
jurisdiction’.  
 
Sustainable and Equitable Use 
 
This principle advances a substantive goal, rather than a procedural approach. The law of the 
sea requires something like the sustainable use of living resources, although this is phrased in 
rather different terms, such as the somewhat contentious concepts of maximum sustainable 
yield and optimum utilization.
78
 The commentary to this principle focuses on intra-
generational equity, although it ultimately embraces the needs of future generations.
79
 This is 
in line with idea of sustainable development. Equity is seen to embrace questions of access, 
benefit sharing and capacity building, which provide starting points in deciding how best to 
use and distribute resources located in ABNJ. It is not as clear how sustainable use or 
equitable use might apply to non-living resources of the Area, given their finite nature. 
Although I find myself in agreement with this principle, in general terms, I am concerned 
about the inherently contestable nature of both sustainability and equity as principles. There 
is a place for the principle, but there is much work to do to flesh out how it can shape specific 
decisions on resource use. Indeed, as Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell point out, since equitable 
use requires a balancing of interest between interested parties it is less well-suited to the 




Public Availability of Information 
 
As indicated in the context of the principle on cooperation, good governance requires 
availability of information. This not only improves the evidence basis for decision-making, it 
helps to encourage participation and appreciation of decision-making. This in turn 
strengthens the legitimacy of the governance mechanisms. Apart from the general references 
to the Rio Declaration and Arhus Convention, and the specific citing of Article 204-6 of the 
LOSC, there are other provisions of the LOSC that require information to be made available, 
and perhaps support the principle. This includes Articles 119(2) and 143. The former requires 
sharing scientific information about high seas fishing activities through regional fisheries 
management organizations and arrangements. This must be provided regularly, but only as 
deemed appropriate, indicating that the obligation to disseminate information in not 
unqualified. Somewhat detailed information sharing requirements are provided for by Article 
                                                   
78 See LOSC, Article 119, but also Article 61-4.  
79 Oude Elferink, supra note 1,  section Sustainable and Equitable Use. 
80 Supra note 42, at 201. 
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143. Again this is facilitated institutionally, through the International Seabed Authority. 
There is a strong emphasis on promotion of research, and specific modalities of supporting 
research are indicated. This goes beyond mere research to capacity building. These provisions 
in respect of fisheries and mineral exploitation in the Area may not go quite as far as Article 
205 since there are explicit requirements to ensure that the information becomes publicly 
available, but they do indicate the pervasive requirement of information availability in good 
governance regimes. 
 
Transparent and Open Decision-making Processes 
 
As Oude Elferink notes, this principle is less well grounded in the LOSC than it is in the Fish 
Stocks Agreement. This perhaps reflects the wider changes in perceptions about the 
requirements of proper decision-making procedures that have developed since the adoption of 
the LOSC in 1982. There has been a broader change in the perception of how public 
decision-making should be conducted and this now demands a degree of participation by a 
wider range of stakeholders. Although this represents a challenge to the traditionally State-
centric view of international law, one could argue that the requirement to ensure transparent 
and open decision-making flows from the basic principle of good faith and so it is well rooted 
in international law. It could also be regarded as a fundamental attribute of the rule of law.
81
 
As with the previous principle, it contributes the broader legitimacy of decisions, and this in 
turn may help improve compliance. Openness may also increase the scope for improving 
management because a broader category of participants can bring alternative insights into 
questions of resource use and management.
82
 This much is alluded to in the ILA Resolution 
of Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development, which notes that [p]ublic participation is 
essential to sustainable development and good governance in that it is a condition for 
responsive, transparent and accountable governments as well condition for the active 
engagement of equally responsive, transparent and accountable civil society organizations, 
including industrial concerns and trade unions.’
83
 Transparency is pervasive and applies not 
all aspects of the regulatory process. Indeed, ITLOS raised the requirement of transparency in 
the Area Advisory Opinion to buttress its arguments in favour of sponsoring States adopting 
reasonable and non-arbitrary regulatory measures rather than rely upon contractual measures 
to ensure the compliance.
84
 The tribunal observed that a purely contractual approach would 
be insufficient. Since contracts may not be publicly available, so it would be difficult to 
verify that States had met their obligations to ensure compliance and liability for damage 
under Article 139. 
 
The Responsibility of States as Stewards of the Global Marine Environment 
 
The starting point for this principle is the proposition that States have a responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause harm to the 
environment.
85
 This much seems relatively uncontroversial, embodying as it does the well 
accepted sic utere principle. Oude Elferink’s commentary then goes on to develop the notion 
                                                   
81 See for example, J. Ebbesson, ‘The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law’ 
(1997) 8 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 51 
82 J. Ebbesson, ‘The rule of law in governance of complex socio-ecological changes’ (2010) 20 Global 
Environmental Change 414. 
83 ILA Resolution 3/2002, para 5.1.  Available online at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/25 
84 Supra note 52, paras. 223-6. 
85 Oude Elferink, supra note 1, section The Responsibility of States as Stewards of the Global Marine 
Environment. 
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of due diligence as a matter of State responsibility. This was considered above and it clearly 
has a role to play in guiding States’ responsibilities in ABNJ. The question remains whether a 
general responsibility of stewardship can be extrapolated from this proposition. Whilst I think 
that the notion of stewardship should have a role to play, the principle needs to be more 
widely grounded in a range of practice.
86
 Indeed, as Oude Elferink notes, the core 
significance of stewardship rather is concerned with responsible use of the environment and 
all types of resources. Stewardship thus has affinity with the principles of sustainable and 
equitable use and the principle of international cooperation. Stewardship is not merely about 
prevention of harm, it is also about preservation and conservation of resources, and more 
importantly involves question of ownership, and allocation of resources.
87
 The commentary 
then indicates a range of forms it may take, from the articulation of a common concern, to a 
stronger form of trusteeship, based on the public trust doctrine, seeming to prefer the former 
approach. In this sense it legitimates the ‘interests’ of a wider range of actors in the 
governance of matters that might otherwise have been regarded as subject to exclusive 
sovereignty. This avoids the difficulties that are associated with a more substantive notion of 
stewardship that encompasses question of resource use and access, favouring instead a more 
procedural approach that requires, in some unspecified way, some means of including 
interests in a decision-making process. 
 This advances a rather weak form of stewardship and it does not seem to add much to 
the foregoing principles. The meaning and content of stewardship needs to be defined more 
carefully. As do the precise means by which it operates. If stewardship is a responsibility, 
then does this entail rights that can be used to secure compliance with stewardship duties? 
This question of how to hold States to account for stewardship is crucial. Stewardship 
requires a high degree of institutional support since it entails the existence of complex 
divisions of responsibility and accountability. Unfortunately, in a strongly decentralised 
system like international law, the scope for effective monitoring and control over public 
responsibilities is quite limited. It might be argued that certain environmental commitments 
possess an erga omnes character that grants individual States the right to pursue claims for 
braces of collective interests.
88
 However, although such a right exists in principle, it is not 
clear how effective it will be in practice since such a right is contingent on the underlying 
collective interest being sufficiently well-defined and worth pursuing as a legal claim. By 
way of illustration, we can look at experiences in respect of (not) holding States to account 
for their failure to properly conserve and manage the living resources of the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). Arguably the EEZ represents a form of stewardship, whereby the 
claim to enjoy exclusive resource rights was justified and balanced against certain 





Law as a system requires specific rules and decisions to be made in accordance with pre-
existing or higher order principles. This requirement of coherence helps ensure consistency in 
the application of law and allows for legal agents to plan and carry out their activities. 
Principles make the law intelligible and ascertainable. This alone provides good reason for 
trying to identify governance principles for ABNJ. Such principles must be in accordance 
                                                   
86 See for example, Articles 87(2), 116 and 193 of the LOSC, and Article 6.1 of the FAO Code of Conduct on 
Responsible Fisheries, supra note 66. 
87 Barnes, supra note 11, at 155-63. 
88 See Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility 2001.  The draft Article are available online at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
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with the fundamental values of the community. They must also be aligned with the nature of 
the regulatory subject matter. Although Oude Elferink adopts a largely inductive approach, 
drawing his principles from the existing body of rules on the law of the sea, the eventual list 
of principles largely meets these more fundamental demands. It is important to stress the 
directive and coordinating function of principles, and to emphasise that this is an inherent 
quality of principles that is not contingent on their particular manifestation in a binding or 
non-binding instrument.  
Most of the listed principles relate to legal process rather than matters of substance. 
There is nothing wrong with such a focus, but one should appreciate that this also demands 
strong institutional mechanisms that support procedural demands.
89
 It is not at all clear 
whether existing mechanisms are fully capable of delivering this at the present time, given 
the decentralised nature of international law and the absence of cross sectoral management 
regimes capable of putting principles into practice. Nor as, Oude Elferink points out, does 
there appear to be much appetite for a global organisation for governing all of the above.
 90
  
So we are left with what might be termed soft institutional support through the UN General 
Assembly and Meetings of States Parties. Although some principles allude to substantive 
goals, they tend to focus on requirements of general environmental protection rather than 
difficult issues of resource allocation. This approach is understandable, first given the focus 
of governance on decision-making, but also the difficulty of reconciling what appear to be 
fundamental differences between States concerning the legal status of certain resources and 
the potential distribution of benefits derived from ABNJ. One might consider whether there is 
any need to try and structure the principles, or identify a hierarchy. However, this would miss 
the point about their inherent coordinating function. As soon as one looks at the principles in 
any detail, it becomes immediately clear that they do not and should not operate in isolation. 
This points to a fundamental role for integration in decision-making. Integration requires not 
just the use of principles in combination, it requires a cross-sectoral approach to regulation, 
capable of accommodating complex interactions and cumulative impacts of activities. It also 
means that ABNJ cannot be governed in isolation from other ocean spaces. Finally, 
governance must not be seen as limited to the domain of law or politics. Although principles 
encompassing science-based decision-making, precaution and ecosystem approaches are 
relatively new, they have quickly become central features of marine management regimes 
and such should be recognised in the basic list of governance principles.  
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